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Abstract: 
The monograph enquires into the fairness dilemma in connection with the construction of 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in light of relevant colonial-era Nile 
treaties, post-1990 Nile framework instruments, and international watercourses law. The 
GERD is now a fait accompli, but fairness considerations will continue to be vital issues in 
its completion, filling, and operation. The monograph argues that the GERD is a symbol of 
a fair share of the Nile waters by Ethiopia, the realization of which depends on, inter alia, 
an appropriate economic return, and prevention of significant impacts. The monograph 
also calls for a process to address the issue of unfair agreements, and argues that, although 
fairness application can be complex, the notions of procedural fairness and distributive 
justice can be applied to define and delineate the principle with reference to a specific 
treaty regime. 
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Introduction 
Ethiopia’s contribution to the Nile waters is attributed to the Sobat (Baro) river, which 
flows into, and contributes almost half of the waters of the White Nile; the Atbara (Tekeze 
and Angereb) river, that flows into the main stream of the Nile (and contributes 10% of 
Nile waters); and the Blue Nile, which is the major source of the Nile with 60% 
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contribution to Nile waters.1 All these rivers make up more than 86% of Nile waters.2 The 
current use of the Nile waters by Ethiopia is negligible; the reasons for such a low use 
range from a lack of capacity and resources to a bar on the desire to utilise the water 
resources imposed by a colonial legacy and downstream countries. After a devastating 
internal civil war lasting three decades until the early 1990s, Ethiopia began to engage in 
sustainable development efforts, including exploring opportunities to utilise its 
transboundary rivers for hydro-power generation and other uses.3 As part of this effort, the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction 20 kilometres from the 
Sudanese border since 2011 on the Blue Nile, was designed to generate 6000 megawatt 
(mw) in electricity.4  
Inside Ethiopia, the GERD is seen as a main driver for prosperity through clean energy 
generation, and as a national symbol. Egypt opposed the project until recently for fear of 
its impact,5 but also because of the sentiment attached to the Nile as a historical gift to 
Egypt.6 Other Nile riparian countries, including Sudan, now support the construction of the 
                                                          
1 Sutcliffe, J. V., & Parks, Y. P., The Hydrology of the Nile. (IAHS Press: Wallingford, 1999) 
p.127 http://www.hydrosciences.fr/sierem/produits/biblio/hydrology%20of%20the%20Nile.pdf. 
2 Ibid.  
3 See e.g. The Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II), Ethiopian National Planning 
Commission, May, 2016, pp.181-183. 
4 See Salini-Impregilo, the GERD contractor’s webpage 
 http://www.salini-impregilo.com/en/projects/in-progress/dams-hydroelectric-plants-hydraulic-
works/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-project.html.  
5 Egypt’s Perspective towards the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP), allAfrica, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201512072751.html. 
6 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 18 January 2014, 
 http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf, Art. 44. It reads: 
“The State shall protect the River Nile, preserve Egypt's historical rights thereto, rationalize and 
maximize its use, and refrain from wasting or polluting its water. The State shall also protect 
groundwater; adopt necessary means for ensuring water security; and support scientific research in 
that regard. 
Every citizen is guaranteed the right to enjoy the River Nile. It is prohibited to trespass the 
riverbank reserve or harm the riverine environment. The State shall guarantee eliminating any 
trespass against the River Nile as regulated by Law.” 
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GERD.7 A western advocacy group, International Rivers Network, opposed to the project 
for reasons of environmental concerns,8 while others from Africa and elsewhere consider it 
as ‘a symbol of Regional Integration’9 and ‘an opportunity for collaboration and shared 
benefits in the Easter Nile Basin.’10 
The dam has been a source of tension between Egypt and Ethiopia11 up until President Al-
Sisi came to power in June 2014. Subsequently, a series of painstaking negotiations among 
the three countries, culminated in the adoption of the ‘Declaration of Principles between 
The Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the 
Republic of the Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project’ (‘DoPs’) in 
March 2015.12  
The path to concluding the DoPs was hindered by perceived legal claims and counter-
claims as well as differences over facts. Despite fundamental disagreements between 
Egypt and Ethiopia, a series of talks were held among the parties which led to the 
establishment of the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) in May 2012, at the initiation of 
Ethiopia, to study the effects of the dam on Egypt and the Sudan, and build confidence 
among the parties. The IPoE, constituted of two experts each from Egypt, Sudan and 
Ethiopia, and a further four international experts, published its final report on 31 May, 
                                                          
7 Salman, S., ‘The Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Opportunities & Challenges’ Sudanow (2013) 
http://sudanow.info.sd/the-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-opportunities-challenges/. 
8 The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Fact Sheet, International Rivers, 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-fact-sheet-8213. 
9 The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – A Symbol of Regional Integration, Ventures Africa, 
http://www.ventures-africa.com/archives/40137. 
10 ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: An Opportunity for Collaboration and Shared Benefits 
in the Eastern Nile Basin’, MIT Abdul Latif Jameel World Water and Food Security Lab (2014) 
http://jwafs.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/GERD_2014_Full_Report.pdf. 
11 Kelley, M. B., & Johnson, R. ‘Egypt Is Prepared To Bomb All of Ethiopia's Nile Dams’ (Stratfor 
Business Insider, 13 October, 2012) http://www.businessinsider.com/hacked-stratfor-emails-egypt-
could-take-military-action-to-protect-its-stake-in-the-nile-2012-10#ixzz3afm498Zg. 
12 Agreement on Declaration of Principles between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of the Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP) (DoPs), 23 March 2015 
http://hornaffairs.com/en/2015/03/25/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-agreement-on-declaration-of-
principles-full-text/. 
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2013. The report is not publicly available in full, and, at the time, was interpreted by Egypt 
as a ‘confirmation’ of its concerns that the GERD will ‘significantly harm’ its interests.13 
Ethiopia strongly felt it was ‘vindicated’ by the report as the Panel ruled-out the possibility 
of significant harm, rather emphasising the shared benefits and increased water flow from 
the GERD.14 
The aftermath of the DoPs is largely dominated by a spirit of cooperation and mutual trust 
among Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. Although the DoPs is founded on modern legal 
principles of international watercourses law, old legal arguments are neither expressly 
denounced nor recognised in the Declaration. The DoPs was followed by the signing of the 
Khartoum minutes15 in December 2015 in which the parties reiterated their continued 
commitment to the DoPs, and also agreed to hire the French consultancy firms, BRLi 
Group and Artelia, to help them comprehend the downstream impacts of the GERD.16 This 
then led to the signing of a contract between the three countries and the two firms in 
September 2016 to conduct studies on ‘Water Resources/Hydropower System Simulation 
Model and Transboundary Environmental and Socio-economic Impact Assessment’17 of 
the GERD. the precise scope, nature and purpose of the studies are not publicly known to 
say the least; the firms’ work is planned to be finalised within 11 months beginning the 
end of 2016,18 which may well arrive after the two GERD turbines began generating 
electric power,19  and the major structures of the dam are complete and  ready for dam 
                                                          
13 Supra Egypt’s Perspective note 5 p. 2.  
14 Berhane, D., ‘Anti-dam group doctor’s report, joins Egypt to stop Ethiopia’s dam’ (Horn Affairs 
English, 11 April, 2014) http://hornaffairs.com/en/2014/04/11/ethiopia-dismisses-international-
rivers-as-egypts-proxy-full-text-included/.  
15 Salman, S., ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: the Road to the Declaration of Principles 
and the Khartoum Document’ Water International (2016) Vol 41, number 4, p.512. 
16 Ibid, p. 523.  
17 Goshu.,S., ‘BRLi, Artelia Get Clearance to Conduct GERD Impact Studies’ (Ethiopian 
Reporter, 24 September, 2016). 
18 ‘Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan sign final contracts on Nile dam studies’ (Ahramonline, 10 September, 
2016). 
19 ‘GERD to start generate 750 MW soon’ EBC (15 October, 2015) 
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reservoir filling.20 However, the studies at issue, in particular the hydropower system 
simulation model, may be of vital use and help ‘in the negotiations on the period of filling 
the GERD reservoir,’21 if the parties manage to make use of them as a positive resource of 
cooperation rather than that of contention.  
While the tripartite meetings on the GERD have been on-going in a positive spirit of 
promoting mutual interest of the three countries, the late 2016 civil unrest in Ethiopia led 
the latter to accuse Egypt, or some Egyptian institutions, of backing the violent protests in 
the country. President Mulatu Teshome in his address to the Ethiopian Parliament on 10 
October, 2016 asserted that, ‘groups and individuals which our country describe as 
terrorists like the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ginbot 7, work hand in hand with 
Egyptian institutions and are responsible for the recent destruction in our country.’22 
President Al-Sisi swiftly denied the Ethiopian allegation by saying that, ‘Egypt does not 
conspire against anyone.’23  He went on ‘to assure the brothers in Ethiopia that Egypt has 
never ever offered any support to the opposition and will not carry out any conspiratorial 
action against Ethiopia.’24 While this makes the Ethio-Egyptian relations politically fluid,25 
‘the three countries have officially agreed to continue negotiations on the GERD;’ the 
Ethio-Sudanese relationship in particular is thriving as Sudan’s plan ‘to build a 3000 
megawatt power transmission line from the GERD’26 to its cities reveals.  
                                                                                                                                                                               
 http://www.ebc.et/web/ennews/-/gerd-to-start-generate-750-mw-soon.  
20 Zhang, Y., Erkyihum, S., & Block, P., ‘Filling the GERD: evaluating hydroclimatic variability 
and impoundment strategies for Blue Nile riparian countries’, Water International (2016) vol. 41, 
Issue 4, p. 594. The hydrologists in this paper predicts that filling of the GERD ‘is likely to begin 
as early as 2018.’  
21 Supra Salman note 15, p. 524. 
22 Boh, E., ‘Ethiopia accuses Egypt of 'fuelling' violence’ (Africanews, 10 October, 2016) 
http://www.africanews.com/2016/10/10/ethiopia-accuses-egypt-of-fueling-violence/.  
23 Abdelatti, A., ‘Egypt's Sisi denies supporting opposition in Ethiopia’ (Reuters, 13 October, 
2016) http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-unrest-egypt-idUKKCN12D2L5.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Zaher, A., ‘Egypt-Ethiopia tension set to rise’ The Arab Weekly, 2016/10/23, Issue: 78, p.  9. 
26 ‘Sudan to build power transmission line from Ethiopia’s GERD: minister’ (Sudan Tribune, 28 
October, 2016) http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60680.  
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These topical but complex developments, coupled with the controversies surrounding old 
and post-1990 Nile ‘commitments’, make the GERD a unique example of the fairness 
dilemma, which entails distinct scholarly enquiry.  
In light of these developments in the Nile Basin, this monograph seeks to examine three 
legal questions relating to the principle of fairness. The first concerns whether the GERD’s 
[un]fairness can be judged on the basis of relevant colonial-era treaties, the 1902 (Anglo-
Ethiopian) and the 1959 Nile Treaties in particular.27 The second concerns whether the 
1993 Framework Agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia, and the 2015 DoPs provide a 
fair justification for the construction and operation of the GERD. The last, queries whether 
the GERD in general, and the DoPs in particular, will have legal implications for basin-
level cooperation under or outside the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement 
(CFA) and international watercourses law more generally. Put differently, it queries 
whether or not there are lessons to be learnt from the case study for international law more 
generally. These and related questions cannot be tackled without explaining the nature of 
the principle of fairness.   
The Principle of Fairness  
Features and Challenges  
 
                                                          
27 As discussed later (infra [colonial-era treaties and the fairness of the GERD] sec), the 1902 Nile 
treaty is referred to as a colonial-era treaty since Britain, one of the parties to the treaty, was in 
control of both Sudan and Egypt; moreover, Although the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement was 
concluded by the two independent states of Egypt and the Sudan, it is referred to as a colonial-era 
treaty in this work because most of the other Nile riparians were still under colonial domination. 
African states were by and large under colonial rule at the time, and the decolonisation process 
only began in the 1960s. See e.g. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, 14 December 1960, Resolution 1514 (XV), United Nations General 
Assembly. 
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Thomas Franck’s pioneering work on fairness,28 though not the first to introduce the 
subject,29 argued in favour of an emerging legal principle of fairness in international law; 
which, he argued, could be applied to the allocation of resources, and might cover both 
procedural elements and distributive justice. The procedural aspect of fairness, as a legal 
concept, deals with participation and the involvement of concerned parties in the 
formulation and development of legal rules which legitimise both law-making and 
implementation processes.30 Conversely, distributive justice, as a moral notion, deals with 
the essence, content and impact of laws on people, communities and states.31 This is to be 
determined in light of history and societal context, and is subject to the ‘moderate scarcity’ 
of resources, ‘community’ and ‘reciprocity.’32 Due to these characteristics two principal 
caveats were proposed to the fairness discourse: Firstly, absolute or non-negotiable claims 
over contentious rights and duties must be rejected, and secondly inequality can be 
tolerated or recognised as a matter of fact, so long as such an inequality ultimately serves 
fairness, and thus aims to narrow down an existing gap between the beneficiary and the 
deprived.33 When applying the fairness discourse to international law the proposition 
rightly assumes the existence of international law as a mature legal system, which is 
subject to continuous negotiations, compromises and reasoning to achieve a ‘perceived 
fairness’ by concerned parties on a specific subject matter, such as resource allocation.34  
                                                          
28 Franck, T., Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1995). 
29 Rawls, J., ‘Justice as Fairness’ The Philosophical Review Vol. 67(2) pp. 164-194 (1958), pp. 
164-194. 
30 Supra Franck note 28, pp.7-8, 25. 
31 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
32 Ibid, Franck, pp. 8-15. Franck underlined the need for an agreement on ‘a core of reciprocally 
applicable rules’ (p.12). ‘Moderate scarcity’ refers to ‘a finite, non-renewable’ and particularly in 
‘short global supply’ (p. 9). ‘Community’ is meant ‘a social system of continuing interaction and 
transaction. It is only in a community that the bedrock of shared values and developed principles 
necessary to any assessment of fairness is found’ (pp. 9-10). 
33 Ibid, pp. 16-18. 
34 Ibid, p. 14. 
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This whole notion of fairness is seen by some as utopian,35 while as a justified and 
necessary principle in the international community by others.36 The latter position seems a 
dominant view, as will be shown relating to international watercourses law.     
However, the fairness discourse has not defined or described what the principle precisely 
is. Judge Owada,37 in his separate position in the Wall Advisory Opinion submitted that: 
Consideration of fairness in the administration of justice requires equitable treatment of 
the positions of' both sides involved in the subject-matter in terms of the assessment both 
of facts and of law involved.38 
This is in line with the common perception that fairness is synonymous with equity and 
justice39 and thus shares their definition. In Roman [domestic] law, justice is seen as ‘‘the 
set and constant purpose which gives to every man his due.’40 This appears to focus on 
substance than process or procedure. In contrast, For John Rawls, Justice is ‘the first virtue 
of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. …laws and institutions no matter 
how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust’41. 
Evidently, from this definition, justice does not appear to have any meaning without 
fairness (and equity) and vice-versa. The emphasis placed on ‘institutions’ and 
effectiveness in defining fairness and justice poses the question whether they have been 
perceived restrictively to procedural and institutional questions. In contrast, Grotius 
                                                          
35 Tasioulas, J., ‘International Law and the Limits of Fairness’ European Journal of International 
Law Vol 13(4) pp. 993-1023 (2002), pp. 993-1023; Scobbie, I., ‘Tom Franck's Fairness’ European 
Journal of International Law Vol. 13(4) pp. 909-925 (2002), pp. 909-925. 
36 Kritsiotis, D., ‘Imagining the International Community’, European Journal of International Law 
Vol. 13(4) pp. 961-992 (2002), p. 968; Shelton, D., ‘Equity’, in, Bodansky, D., Brunnee, J., & Hey, 
E, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law pp. 640-661 (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2007), pp. 645-649. 
37 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
Separate Opinion of Judge Owada ICJ Repts 2004. 
38 Ibid, p. 260. 
39 Supra Shelton note 36, p. 640. 
40 Moyle, J.B., The Institutes of Justinian, 5th ed. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1913) bk I, title 1  
http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/Anglica/just1_Moyle.htm.  
41 Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) p. 3 
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diligently clarifies that justice is presumed to be clogged not only when it is delayed but 
also where a ‘judgement has been rendered in a way manifestly contrary to law.’42 Hence, 
according to Grotius, deviating from, or complying with, laws, amongst other things, 
constitutes the idea of justice. Again, it is not clear whether his reference to the law is 
meant to embrace both procedure and substance.  
Steven Ratner’s definition, which is beyond national law, describes  
global justice as process or outcome that assigns rights and duties to global actors so 
that it is clear what each such actor is entitled or required to do or have. Norms of 
international law are just if they assign those rights and duties in a way that meets a 
substantive standard of justice.43  
This clearly captures both procedure and content of laws in the realm of justice.  
Equity, by contrast to justice, implies a general principle of law, filling gaps in the law, not 
applying unjust laws and adaptable interpretation and application of laws to particular 
cases.44 Indeed, this approach to equity appears to be broader in scope, comprising both 
processes and substantive matters, and possibly, going beyond the law in applying ethical 
and moral imperatives. For this reason, the nature of equity has been subjected to more 
controversy. One view broadly sees equity as ‘subjective appreciation’ of facts and laws in 
dealing with legal claims and counter-claims,45 while another view, which resembles 
Grotius’s view on justice considers it as ‘an expression of an objective idea of justice.’46  
                                                          
42 Grotius, H., The Law of War and Peace, Book III, Chapter 2, Vol. 1 (1625). 
http://lonang.com/library/reference/grotius-law-war-and-peace/gro-302/. 
43  Ratner, R. S., The Thin Justice of International Law: A Moral Reckoning of the Law of Nations 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) p 44. Italics in the original.  
44 Akehurst, M., ‘Equity and General Principles of Law’ The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly Vol. 25(4) pp. 801-825 (1976), pp.801-802; McIntyre, O., ‘Utilization of Shared 
International Freshwater Resources: The Meaning and Role of “Equity” in International Water 
Law’ Water International Vol. 38(2) pp. 112-129. (2013), pp.114-117. 
45 Jennings., R., ‘Equity and Equidistance Principles’ Annuaire Suisse de Droit International Vol. 
27, 31-35 (1986), pp. 27, 31. 
46 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) Judgment of 20 April 
2010 Separate Opinion of Judge Trindade ICJ 2010, paras. 10 & 11. 
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From this one may deduce either justice and equity are different sides of the same coin or 
equity is a tool that can, or ought to, be used to articulate justice with the latter being the 
ultimate objective of applying laws. 
Despite the broader nature of equity and its close relationship, to say the least, with 
justice,47 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) detached it from the notion of 
‘distributive justice’48 without clear explanation. In contrast, Steven Ratner, building on 
Hart’s conception of justice, writes ‘in thinking about justice as relational (between 
different claimants’ of rights/duties), it seems like we cannot escape the idea of 
distributions, or more precisely of allocations….’49  
Misleadingly, the debate over distributive justice is often framed in international law in the 
context of the North-South divide and the question of legal or moral duty to the sharing of 
resources between developed and developing members of the international community.50 
While there is a merit in this debate which is not within the scope of this monograph, it 
seems to overlook distributive justice’s wider appeal beyond such a divide. For example, 
in relation to: a) resource sharing among members of the same category (developed or 
developing countries), b) historical or current specific injustice by a member of one 
category against a member of the other category, and c) relating to special legal regimes 
such as international watercourses law. With this in mind, the monograph aims to probe 
the justifiability of the outright rejection or support for distributive justice as a legal 
concept.  
                                                          
47 Lowe, V., ‘The Role of Equity in International Law’ Australian Yearbook of International Law 
Vol. 12 pp. 54-81 (1988-89), p.54; supra Akehurst note 44. 
48 Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) Judgment of 24 
February ICJ Repts 1982, para. 71. 
49 Supra Ratner note 43. The clarification in brackets added for clarification.  
50 Prost., M., & Camprudi., A. T., ‘Against Fairness? International Environmental Law, 
Disciplinary Bias and Pareto Justice’ Leiden Journal of International Law Vol. 25(2) pp. 379-396 
(2012), p.379. 
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Given that the concepts of justice, equity and fairness are inherently interweaved with each 
other, this work explores their nature by applying John Rawls’51 thesis that ‘the 
fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness,’52 in all its aspects and caveats, 
including distributive justice, as meticulously articulated in Franck’s53 fairness discourse. 
Given that Franck has not defined the principle of fairness, and recognising that the 
application of fairness, justice and equity may well vary from one field to another 
depending on relevant laws and the objectives therein, the principle of fairness, for the 
purpose of this article, will imply a system of ‘fair dealing’ or ‘fair play’54 in relations 
among sovereign states, which includes transboundary resource sharing, with the aim of 
attaining legally acceptable, proportionate and just, as opposed to arbitrary and unequal, 
processes and results.55 This general description of fairness only serves as a starting point 
in the application of the concept to specific cases and problems.  
Before applying the principle to international watercourses law, however, a few points 
merit consideration here. The characterisation of distributive justice by Franck as a moral 
or ethical, rather than legal, concept is troubling. Of course, laws and regulations are 
informed by [im]moral underpinnings; the fact of the matter is that substantive matters of 
law in fields ranging from international trade, economic law, and the law of the sea, to that 
of humanitarian law and human rights are predominantly a matter of law rather than 
abstract ethical standards. However, the fairness discourse has not denied the embodiment 
                                                          
51 Supra Rawls note 29. 
52 Ibid, p.164. 
53 Supra Franck note 28. 
54 Maiese, M.  & Burgess, H., Principles of Justice and Fairness, Beyond Intractability, 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/print/2373. 
55 Wolfrum, R., ‘Commentary on Purposes and Principles (Art 1)’, in, Simma, B., Khan, D. E., 
Nolte, G., & Paulus, A., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 3rd ed. Volume 1 pp. 
113-114 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012), pp.113-4; supra Tunisia/Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya note 49, para. 71; Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v 
Slovakia) (ICJ 25 September 1997) 37 ILM 162 (1998), para. 147; Yihdego, Z., & Rieu-Clarke, A., 
‘An exploration of fairness in international law through the Blue Nile and GERD’ Water 
International (2016) Volume 41, Issue 4 pp. 528-549. 
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of substantive rules of equity as fairness onto treaties and conventional arrangements, as 
this monograph will illustrate.  
Similarly, while socio-economic or other forms of inequality (or inequity) is a fact, be it in 
the relations between individuals or states, its open endorsement in international law, 
conceptually or normatively, defeats the core values and foundations of international law, 
including the principles of sovereign equality and permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources.56 It may well be that the fairness discourse takes into account existing situations, 
including inequality, as one factor for determining or promoting distributive justice,57 
which is not the same as recognising such disparity as a matter of principle.  
The elements of ‘community’ of states and resource ‘scarcity’, as part of the principle at 
issue, are persuasive and imperative; the addition of ‘reciprocity’ as a condition to the 
fairness discourse can, however, be supported or challenged; some cases and claims 
associated with transboundary resources can be of an erga omnes, and not reciprocal, 
character.58 Yet reciprocity remains crucial in inter-state relations, including in the 
governance of trans-boundary resources, for purposes of promoting equity and mutual 
interest among countries.59 
There is hardly a uniform definition nor a universally shared perception of the principle of 
fairness in its various names and terms, as a result, scholars question its existence as a 
                                                          
56 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 12 December 1974, Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 
United Nations General Assembly, Arts. 2, 8, 10. 
57 Ibid, Art. 25; see also The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
1994, 1869 UNTS 299. The first preambular paragraph of the Agreement promotes inter alia 
‘optimal use of the world’s resources… in a manner consistent with their [States] respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development.’ This appears to acknowledge and 
accept the economic and development levels of WTO member States. The second preambular 
paragraph, however, emphasises the ‘need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.’ 
58 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) 
ICJ Second Phase Judgment of 5 February 1970. See also supra Ratner, note 43, pp. 59-62.  
59 The Diversion of Water from Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium) PCIJ Series A/B No 70 (28 June 
1937). 
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legal concept in international law.60 While sharing and acknowledging these qualms, the 
fairness discourse argues that there is an emerging recognition of equity as fairness in 
international case law and treaty law.61 At the very least, it is argued that, fairness 
constitutes a general principle of law as recognised in Article 38 (1) (c) of the I.C.J. 
Statute.62 The next section applies the principle of fairness to international watercourses 
law through the well-developed concept of equity.  
 
Relevance to Watercourses Law in General 
 
Equity as fairness comes with different clusters including ‘corrective equity’ and ‘broadly 
conceived equity.’63 The latter is a rule-based equity established by a specific treaty or 
policy regime.64 What it became later as the Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997 (UNWCC)65 was used by Franck as 
one of the examples of applying fairness, even if it was only a draft Convention then. 
Franck argued that the pursuit for ‘distributive justice’ can be attained by considering 
relevant factors including socio-economic situations in riparian states for purposes of 
determining an ‘equitable apportionment of river water’ on a case-by-case-basis.66 Nearly 
20 years later on from when the fairness discourse sparked a serious debate among 
                                                          
60 Malanczuk, P., Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th ed., Routledge: 
Cheltenham, 1997), pp. 54-55; Brownlie, I., Legal Status of Natural Resources in International 
Law (Some Aspects) (Volume 162) (Brill Nijhoff: Leiden, 1979), p. 288. 
61 Supra Franck note 28, 79-80. 
62 Supra Franck note 28, pp. 47-79. 
63 Ibid, pp. 56-75; supra Lowe note 48, pp.54-8; McIntyre, O., Environmental Protection of 
International Watercourses under International Law (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2007), p. 120. 
64 Supra Franck note 28, pp. 65-66. 
65 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May 
1997, United Nations. Entered into legal force on 17 August, 2014. For some background see The 
International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses 1994 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/8_3_1994.pdf  
66 Supra Franck note 28, pp. 74-75. 
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scholars, the UNWCC entered into force in August 2014; the basic rights and duties 
enshrined in the Convention also reflect customary international law.67 In this sense, 
Franck’s contribution to the fairness debate in international law more generally, appears to 
have borne fruit, although not without challenges.  
One of the challenges (or maybe opportunities) might be that the distinction between 
procedural and substantive law is not always a clear-cut case. The UNWCC reflects both 
the opportunities and challenges of the fairness discourse, consisting of detailed and 
complex substantive and procedural rules on the sharing and protection of transboundary 
water resources. The principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation,68 which tends to be a 
favourite of upstream countries,69 and the duty not to inflict significant harm70 as a 
subordinate to the equitable principle and generally favoured by downstream countries,71 
constitute the core elements of distributive justice. However, international watercourses 
law is not merely about sharing and utilising water resources. The protection and 
preservation of watercourses and their natural environment72 as a legal principle 
constitutes part of distributive justice.73 The scope of this substantive duty under the 
UNWCC has been articulated by Salman as follows: 
                                                          
67 Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of International Commission of the River Oder 
(United Kingdom v Poland) PCIJ Series A No 23 Annex 3 (Order made on 20 August 1929), p. 27; 
supra Hungary v Slovakia note 56, para. 85; supra McIntyre note 63, p. 112; Magsig, B.-O., 
International Water Law and the Quest for Common Security (Routledge: Cheltenham, 2015), p. 
49. 
68 Supra UNWCC note 65, Arts. 5, 6. 
69 Salman, S., ‘Entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention: why should it matter?’ 
International Journal of Water Resources Development, 31:1, 4-16, p. 9. DOI: 
10.1080/07900627.2014.952072. 
70 Supra UNWCC note 65, Art. 7. It has been clarified, however, that downstream countries can 
also harm upstream countries see e.g. Salman S., ‘Downstream Riparians Can Also Harm 
Upstream Riparians: The Concept of Foreclosure of Future Uses’ Water International (2010) Vol. 
35(4) pp. 350-364. 
71 Supra Salman note 69. 
72 Supra UNWCC note 65, Arts. 20-26; Birnie, P., Boyle, A., & Redgwell, C., International Law 
and the Environment (3rd ed., Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2009), pp. 535-582. 
73 McCaffrey, S., The Law of International Watercourses (2nd ed., Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 1997), pp. 387-463; supra Magsig note 67. 
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The Convention establishes a number of obligations on the watercourse states, 
including protection and preservation of ecosystems; prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution; introduction of alien or new species; and protection and 
preservation of the marine environment. A Statement of Understanding issued by the 
[UN General Sixth Committee] Working Group clarified that these provisions impose 
a due diligence standard on watercourse states.74 
The UNWCC reconciles the principle of environmental protection with the principle of 
equitable utilisation on two grounds; the first, as enshrined under Article 5 itself, the 
equitable principle obliges watercourse states to take ‘into account the interests of the 
watercourse States concerned, consistent the adequate protection of the watercourse.’ And 
the second, as enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention, is that the realisation of the 
equitable utilisation must take into account factors such as socio-economic needs, impacts 
of water use, current and potential use and ‘Conservation, protection, development and 
economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken 
to that effect.’75 
However, such factors might be criticised for lacking empirical guidance and arguably for 
not objectively determinable. As Professor Dellapenna reflects upon, however,  
Non-lawyers, particularly engineers and hydrologists, sometimes see in these catalogues 
of factors a poorly stated equation. By this view, if one simply fills in numerical values 
                                                          
74 Supra Salman note 69, p. 10.  
75 Supra UNWCC note 65, Art 6 (f); the full list of factors is: 
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural 
character; 
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; 
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; 
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse 
States; 
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the 
watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; 
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use. 
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for each factor, one could somehow calculate each watercourse state’s share of the water 
without reference to political or other non-quantitative variables. They simply ignore that 
the UN Convention…and the Helsinki Rules are legal documents that ultimately are 
addressed to judges. Judges make judgements, and in the English language, at least, the 
word judgement carries a strong connotation that the result is not dictated in any 
immediate sense by the factual and other inputs that the judge relies upon in exercising 
judgement. Any attempt to treat the list of relevant factors as an algorithm simply misses 
the point entirely.76 
Article 6 of the UNWCC further reinforces this by clarifying that: 
The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in 
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and 
equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached 
on the basis of the whole.77  
Hence, the principle of equitable utilisation serves as an umbrella and primary principle in 
applying distributive justice, being subordinated by the environmental protection and no 
significant harm principles.78 Furthermore, the umbrella principle of international 
watercourses law and the factors necessary to determine equity are subject ‘to 
consultations in a spirit of cooperation,’79 which suggests that they can only be applied on 
a case-by-case basis depending on natural, man-made and other features of a watercourse. 
It follows from this that the equitable utilisation primary principle along with its 
subordinate norms and factors, as enshrined in the UNWCC, truly align to the notion of 
distributive justice for two simple reasons (i) it deals with the content and essence of the 
                                                          
76 Dellapenna, J. W., ‘The customary international law of transboundary fresh waters’, 
International Journal of Global Environmental Issues (2001) Volume 1, Issue 3-4, pp 264-305, p. 
287.    
77Supra UNWCC note 65, Art 6 (3). This needs to be read in conjunction with Art 10 of the 
Convention which suggests that no use has an inherent priority. 
78 Supra Salman note 71, p. 354. 
79 Supra UNWCC note 65, Art 6 (2). 
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law the application of which impacts on states, communities and individuals; and (ii) the 
factors listed to determine the equitable principle further reinforce Franck’s proposition 
that distributive justice should be determined in the context of relevant history and social 
context. Furthermore, the caveats and conditions to distributive justice fit into international 
watercourses law in that water resources are scarce, and competition over them has 
become fierce; there is no place for absolute or non-negotiable claims in the UNWCC as 
required in the fairness discourse too.  
However, we cannot say with certainty that inequality is tolerated in international 
watercourses law. The UNWCC refers to ‘existing and potential use’ as one factor for 
determining equitable use, but it neither endorses nor rejects existing inequality of use 
among riparian states. Another notable difference is that while the international 
watercourses law principles and factors are legally endorsed standards, the fairness 
discourse sees distributive justice as moral notion. Such moral standards can, however, be 
integrated into legal instruments, as Franck himself acknowledges by referring to the terms 
of the (draft) UNWCC itself.  
In contrast to distributive justice, the duty inter alia to cooperate,80 notify and consult,81 
exchange of data and information,82 and dispute settlement provisions83 are procedural in 
character.84 The duty ‘to enter into consultations’ has been extended to managing ‘an 
international watercourse, which may include the establishment of a joint management 
mechanism’85 and ‘Planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse 
                                                          
80Supra UNWCC note 66, Art. 8. Art 25 (1) of the Convention provides: ‘Watercourse States shall 
cooperate, where appropriate, to respond to needs or opportunities for regulation of the flow of the 
waters of an international watercourse.’  
81 Ibid, Arts. 12-18, 24. 
82 Ibid, Arts. 9, 11-19. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Supra McCaffrey note 73, pp. 464-481. 
85 Supra UNWCC note 66, Art 24 (1). 
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and providing for the implementation of any plans adopted.’86 Most importantly, the legal 
entitlement to participate in law making of watercourse states has been duly recognised 
under Article 4 (1) of the UNWCC; it reads: 
Every watercourse State is entitled to participate in the negotiation of and to become a 
party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire international watercourse, as 
well as to participate in any relevant consultations.   
This is extended to any agreement which ‘applies only to a part of the watercourse or to a 
particular project’ if the implementation of such an agreement may significantly affect a 
watercourse state’s legal interests.87 Worthy of note is that Article 5 is also about equitable 
participation.  
These and other procedural aspects of the UNWCC cover a range of activities –ranging 
from participation in law making to that of participation in institutional and formal 
processes and mechanism through which agreed legal standards are realised. This is very 
much in line with the procedural fairness conception of Franck. Unlike distributive justice, 
international watercourses law and Franck’s procedural fairness concern legal (rather than 
moral) arrangements.  
However, such categorisation can be misleading as some of the principles such as the 
equitable utilisation and participation, and the duty to take all appropriate measures to 
prevent significant harm, are both substantive and procedural in nature.88 Furthermore, as 
briefly mentioned earlier the application of the factors that are set out in Article 6 (2) of the 
UNWCC to determine equitable use require consultation and cooperation among 
                                                          
86 Ibid, Art 24 (2) (a). 
87 Ibid, Art (4) (2). See also Art 25 (2) which provides: ‘Unless otherwise agreed, watercourse 
States shall participate on an equitable basis in the construction and maintenance or defrayal of the 
costs of such regulation works as they may have agreed to undertake.’ 
88 Supra McCaffrey note 73, p. 401; Rieu-Clarke, A., & Pegram, G. ‘Impacts on the International 
Architecture for Transboundary Waters’, in, Loures, F. R., & Rieu-Clarke, A., The UN 
Watercourses Convention in Force: Strengthening International Law for Transboundary Water 
Management (Routledge: Abingdon, 2103) pp. 67-76. 
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concerned states. Similarly, the legal commitment on the management of watercourses has 
not only dealt with procedural matters but also with ‘promoting the rational and optimal 
utilization, protection and control of the watercourse’89 which forms part and parcel of the 
equitable utilisation and participation principle. This needs to be read with caution as the 
overlaps between distributive justice and procedural fairness do not fundamentally 
eliminate the natural boundary between a content and procedure of law.  
Undoubtedly, customary international law governing shared watercourses, as represented 
by the UNWCC,90 provides the right platform to exhibit both the merits and challenges of 
the fairness discourse.  
Despite the strong suggestion that some of the core rules of the field at issue constitute 
customary international law, and thus bind all states in respect of all international 
watercourses, the Convention has only been ratified by 36 States and applies to those who 
subscribe to it as far as treaty rights and duties are concerned. This adds to the complexity 
of applying the principles to all watercourses cases, in particular the procedural provisions 
that are key for a fair deal in using and protecting shared water courses as this work will 
demonstrate. Regardless, international watercourses law evidences that the notion of 
distributive justice can be found in special legal regimes of international law such as 
international watercourses law, which appear to challenge its unexplained rejection, 
including by the ICJ, as shown earlier.  
It is of note that the UNWCC is a general instrument, and States parties to the Convention 
are thus allowed (and may also be encouraged) to enter into “watercourse agreements” 
‘which apply and adjust the provision of the present Convention to the characteristics and 
uses of a particular international watercourse or part thereof.’ The implementation and 
                                                          
89 Art 24 (2) (b). 
90 Salman, S., ‘The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: 
Perspectives on International Water Law’ Water Resources Development Vol. 23(4) pp. 625-640 
(2007), pp. 625–640; supra Hungary v Slovakia note 55, para. 85. 
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elaboration of the rules and principles enshrined in the UNWCC on a case-by-case basis 
would appear to be more appropriate, if not absolutely required; and in this article’s case at 
sub basin-level. Basin-wide endeavours, as a basis, need consideration first.  
    
 Relevance to an Emerging Nile Basin Legal Framework 
 
At present, none of Nile-basin countries are parties to the UNWCC which makes the 
search for [un]fairness in Nile water sharing difficult, if not impossible. This is because the 
Convention is not applicable to them without their consent. Countries of the basin do 
however rely on established principles of the law including the ones recognised in, and 
promoted by, the UNWCC as later examined, albeit selectively to substantiate their claims 
and counter-claims.91   
More broadly, Nile basin-level initiatives have endorsed the aforementioned principles of 
international watercourses law. Negotiated within the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)92 
framework, which is of transitional arrangement,93 the Cooperative Framework Agreement 
(CFA)94 aims to promote cooperation, equality, optimal and sustainable use of Nile waters 
and sustainable development.95 Articles 8, 10 and 12 of the CFA deal with the principles of 
information exchange on planned measures, data and information exchange and peaceful 
settlement of disputes respectively, which can be considered as dominantly procedural 
                                                          
91 See sections on Colonial Treaties, post-1990 Instruments. 
92 Salman, S., ‘The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement: A Peacefully Unfolding 
African Spring?’ Water International Vol. 38(1) pp. 17-29 (2013a), pp. 19-20. 
93Ibid. 
94Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA), May 2010, Retrieved from 
http://www.nilebasin.org/images/docs/CFA%20-%20English%20%20FrenchVersion.pdf. Seven 
countries agreed to the text to be opened for signature; six countries namely: Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania have signed the Agreement; Ethiopia, Tanzania and 
Rwanda ratified it; it requires six ratifications for its entry, and will replace the NBI when in full 
legal force. Retrieved from http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/spotlight/99-cfa-overview.  
95 Ibid, Art. 1. 
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commitments. The CFA also aims to establish a Nile River Basin Commission comprising 
Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers, Technical Advisory Committee, 
Sectoral Advisory Committee and Secretariat to manage and administer effective 
cooperation among basin states including the sharing of information on planned 
measures.96  
The substantive duties are similar, if not identical, to that of the UNWCC including the 
principles of equitable use,97 preventing significant harm98 and protecting and conserving 
water resources.99 Interestingly, however, unlike the UNWCC, the CFA refers to the 
principles of ‘subsidiarity’100 and ‘community of interest’101 of Nile basin states; these are 
meant to promote an equitable share and sustainable use of water resources but also a 
sense of community in the sharing of the benefits and responsibilities relating to Nile 
waters and its ecosystem. Worthy of particular mention is the duty of basin States deduced 
from the principle of subsidiarity to ‘allow all those within a State who will or may be 
affected by the project in that State to participate in an appropriate way in the planning and 
implementation process.’102 Similar to the law in other river basins such as the Lake 
Victoria Basin,103 Danube,104 and the EU105 in general, this approach recognises the 
                                                          
96 Ibid, Arts. 15-17, 8. 
97 Ibid, Art. 4. 
98 Ibid, Art. 5. 
99 Ibid, Art. 7. 
100 Ibid, Art. 3. 
101 Ibid, Art. 9. 
102 Ibid, Art 10 (a). This is followed from the main principle and commitment enshrined under Art. 
3 (3) that ‘development and protection of the Nile River Basin water resources is planned and 
implemented at the lowest appropriate level.’ 
103 Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin, 29 Nov. 2003, Art 3 (i) 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/mul41042.pdf.  
104 Convention on the Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River 
(Danube River Protection Convention) , June 29, 1994 (entered into force Oct. 22, 1998), Art. Art 
14 https://www.icpdr.org/main/icpdr/danube-river-protection-convention. 
105 EU Water Framework Directive, 2000/60/EC, 23 October 2000. Para 46 states that ‘To ensure 
the participation of the general public including users of water in the establishment and updating of 
river basin management plans, it is necessary to provide proper information of planned measures 
and to report on progress with their implementation with a view to the involvement of the general 
public before final decisions on the necessary measures are adopted.’ 
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participation (or/and the right to information) of non-state actors in the use and protection 
of river basin waters.  
It can be argued that, although it does not explicitly deal with non-state actors’ 
participation, the UNWCC contains similar principles to that of the CFA, as shown in 
articles 5, 6 and 7 as considered earlier; yet elements such as water contribution to a river 
basin as a factor to determine reasonable use106 appears to be, justifiably107 or 
unjustifiably108 not explicitly included in the UNWCC. Furthermore, ‘the extent and 
proportion of the drainage area in the territory of each Basin State’109  has been listed as 
one of the criterion for equitable share of water resources of a basin under the CFA, but 
not the case in the UNWCC. According to this parameter those who have bigger drainage 
area within a river basin, which may not necessarily imply making more or less water 
contribution to a river basin, have an advantage over those who have smaller basin 
drainage areas, although as enshrined in CFA Art 4 (4) ‘the weight to be given to each 
factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with that of other relevant 
factors’. It is of note that the CFA does not claim to be exhaustive110 on its list of factors, 
which is broadly, but not identically, the case with the UNWCC.111 Notably, the GERD’s 
DoPs boldly endorsed water contribution and the size or proportion of drainage area as 
factors to be taken into account in applying the principle of equitable use of Nile waters.112  
Furthermore, ‘the right of all Nile Basin States to reliable access to, and use of, the Nile 
River system for health, agriculture, livelihoods, production and the environment’ was 
                                                          
106 Ibid, Art. 4. 
107 Supra McIntyre note 63, pp. 182-183. 
108 The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, International Law, August 
1966, International Law Association, Art. V(b). 
109 Supra CFA note 94, Art 4 (i).  
110 Ibid, Art 4 (2) begins with ‘including but not limited to the following’, before listing the factors 
to be used for applying the equitable principle of water utilisation.  
111 Supra UNWCC note 65, Art 6, in comparison to the CFA begins with ‘including’ in listing the 
factors of the equitable principles.  
112 Supra DoPs note 12, sec. 3.2. 
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introduced as part of the water security concept in the CFA;113 this concept is not explicitly 
mentioned in the UNWCC. The concept of water security was intended to bridge the 
differences between downstream and upstream countries114 and thus provide a symbol of 
fairness and equality. However, it was criticised for trying to introduce a non-legal 
concept115 to a legal instrument dealing with a complex issue. Noteworthy is that water 
security appears to be derived from the famous concept of ‘human security’ which is by 
and large seen as a policy concept rather than a legal one.116  
Arguably, the CFA is ‘a peacefully unfolding African spring’117 for the following reasons. 
First, the Agreement, which comprises procedural and substantive principles, that are 
basically similar, but not identical, to the UNWCC, is an emerging legal development. 
Secondly, most Nile basin states subscribe to it and thus represent the hopes and fears of 
overwhelming majority of concerned parties. Finally, the CFA can be seen as declaratory 
of existing legal principles and rules in the field.  
Yet, Egypt and Sudan are not on board for fear that their historic water rights will be 
affected and that the majority of participants will dominate decisions on projects.118 This is 
not only a bar to the emergence of basin-level effective cooperation119 but also detrimental 
to riparian states on matters of information exchange of planned measures via the Nile 
Basin Commission, although this does not equate to the duty of prior notification as 
                                                          
113 Supra CFA note 94, Arts. 2 (f), 14. 
114 Supra Salman note 92, p. 21. 
115 Mekonnen, D. Z., ‘The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the 
Adoption of a “Water Security” Paradigm: Flight into Obscurity or a Logical Cul-de-sac?’ 
European Journal of International Law Vol. 21(2) pp. 421-440 (2010), doi: 10.1093/ejil/chq027 
116 Yihdego, Z., ‘Arms Control and Human Security: What Role for NSAs?’, in, Ryngaert, C., & 
Noortmann, M., Human Security and International Law: The Challenge of Non-State Actors 
(Intersentia: Cambridge, 2014) pp.135-174. 
117 Supra Salman note 92, pp. 17-29. 
118 The Centre of Judicial Studies and Research of the State Council, ‘Final Recommendations of 
the Conference on Nile Basin Agreements in Light of the Provisions of the International Law’ 
African Perspectives Vol. 11(39) pp. 68-70 (2013), pp. 68-70. 
119 McKenzie, S. O., ‘Egypt's Choice: From the Nile Basin Treaty to the Cooperative Framework 
Agreement, an International Legal Analysis’ Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems Vol. 
21 (2012) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2445962##, pp. 571ff. 
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enshrined in articles 12-18 of the UNWCC.120 This led some to consider the CFA as 
untenable and called upon all concerned to negotiating a new legal regime for the Nile,121 
although the main barrier for progress appeared to be lack of political will, an inability to 
compromise and low levels of mutual trust which may, or may not, be resolved through the 
CFA or a newly agreed legal framework.   
Be that as it may, the CFA, either as an emerging treaty regime or a declaration of existing 
legal principles in international watercourses law, would be of vital use to address 
questions of fairness with respect to Nile water sharing. However, the unwillingness of 
Egypt and Sudan in endorsing the framework renders the initiative less relevant to the 
fairness discourse. This is not because the unfairness of the terms of the CFA but due to 
the fact that an agreement is one of the cardinal pre-requisites of a fair system. Resort to 
other relevant instruments, including Nile colonial-era treaties, thus, becomes imperative 
in search for the fairness of the GERD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Colonial-era Treaties and the Fairness of the GERD 
The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty 1902 and the GERD 
 
                                                          
120 Supra Salman note 92, p. 21. 
121 Kimenyi, M., & Mbaku, J., Governing the Nile River Basin: The Search for a New Legal 
Regime (Brookings Institution Press: Arlington, 2015), pp. 83-89. 
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The 1902 Nile treaty is amongst the key colonial treaties which were, and still are, invoked 
by Egypt122 to oppose the construction of any project on major Nile tributaries stemming 
from Ethiopia. This Agreement signed by Ethiopia with colonial Britain (on behalf of 
Sudan) stipulated that Ethiopia must ‘not construct or allow to be constructed any work 
across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their 
waters’123 without consent from Britain and the Sudan.    
Relating to the GERD, Shetewy124 understands the 1902 Treaty as ‘Ethiopia’s commitment 
to preserve Egypt’s historical rights.’125 It is not clear why this Treaty is opposable to 
Ethiopia by Egypt, as the latter was not a party to that particular Treaty, although the 
Treaty should be read in conjunction with other treaties that were meant to protect 
Egyptian (and to some degree Sudan’s) ‘historic rights’. The 1929 Nile Treaty, which was 
concluded between colonial Britain (on behalf of Sudan) and Egypt, not only allocated 48 
and 4 BCM of Nile waters per annum for Egypt and Sudan respectively, but also went on 
to impose basin-wide duties, as enshrined in Paragraph 4 sub-(b) of the Treaty: 
Except with the prior consent of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation works shall be 
undertaken nor electric generators installed along the Nile and its branches nor on the 
lakes from which they flow if these lakes are situated in Sudan or in countries under 
British administration which could jeopardize the interests of Egypt either by reducing 
the quantity of water flowing into Egypt or appreciably changing the date of its flow or 
causing its level to drop. 
                                                          
122 See e.g.  Supra Egyptian Perspectives note 6, p. 4. The 2014 document asserts that ‘the conduct 
of the Ethiopian government is inconsistent with its obligations according to the 1902’ Nile treaty. 
123 Nile Treaty 1902 -Blue Nile and Sobat Rivers (tributaries of the Nile) and Lake Tsana (Ethiopia 
and Sudan): Treaty between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom relative to the frontiers between the 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, signed at Addis Ababa on 15 May 1902, Art III 
http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1902/TS0016.pdf.  
124 Shetewy, M. A., ‘Legal Commitments Regulating the Establishment of Water Projects on 
International Rivers Application Study over the Nile Basin’ African Perspectives Vol. 11(39) pp. 
29-35 (2013). 
125 Ibid, pp. 34-35. 
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Similarly, the bilateral Nile Treaty signed between Egypt and Sudan in 1959 divided the 
entire Nile water flow at 55.5 and 18.5 BCM per year respectively, excluding evaporation 
at the Aswan High Dam reservoir. The 1959 and the 1929 Nile Treaties pose several 
questions, including their fairness to the parties themselves. More specifically, the question 
of their fairness to Sudan (or Egypt) is not within the realm of this monograph; while their 
impact on perceived duties (and rights) of upstream countries, including on Ethiopia is 
certainly relevant here.  
McCaffrey,126 citing Lauterpacht as an authority, sees the 1929 and the 1959 Treaties as 
legal engagements that are designed to share Nile waters that reach Sudan and Egypt; he 
further submits that these two treaties were meant neither to create obligations upon 
upstream countries nor were they endorsements of Egyptian ‘prior apportionment.’ 
However, according to Shaw colonial boundaries are not subject to alteration (also known 
as uti possidetis juris), irrespective of ‘their arbitrary and alien character.’127  Article iii of 
the 1902 Treaty was part of a boundary treaty. If one looks into the history of the 
provision, however, it is clear that it was separately negotiated for about three years to 
protect British Nile interests prior to its insertion onto the 1902 Treaty at a last minute.128 
More vitally, as the article concerns restricting work on a transboundary river, rather than 
including a piece of land, lake or territorial waters to a state’s sovereign territory, it is 
doubtful that the subject of Article iii belongs to boundary delimitation.129 There is no 
evidence that African states meant to include colonial laws and policies with respect to 
                                                          
126 Supra McCaffrey note 73, p. 266. 
127 Shaw, M., ‘The Heritage of States: The Principle of uti possidetis juris Today’ British Yearbook 
of International Law Vol. 67(1) pp. 75-154 (1996), pp. 97, 104. 
128 Woldetsadik, T. W., International Watercourses Law in the Nile River Basin: Three States at a 
Crossroads (Routledge: Abingdon, 2013), p. 100; Garretson, A. H. ‘The Nile Basin’, in, Garretson, 
A. H., Hayton, R. D., & Olmstead C. J., The Law of International Drainage Basins pp. 256-297 
(Oceana: New York, 1967), p. 277. 
129 Supra Shaw note 127, p. 77. 
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transboundary resources within the concept of ‘respect of borders existing on achievement 
of independence.’130  
Although uti possidetis was widely endorsed by tribunals as a means of avoiding territorial 
disputes in Africa and elsewhere,131 its scope and nature was associated with the ‘issue of 
acquisition of title to territory’ and terra nullius (i.e. nobody’s land) territories.132 Judge 
Yusuf argues strongly that: ‘none of the official documents of the OAU (Organisation of 
African Unity) or of its successor organization, the AU (the African Union), relating to 
African conflicts, territorial or boundary disputes, refers to or mentions in any manner the 
principle of uti possidetis juris’133 and it is therefore  a legally different concept from what 
Art 4 of the AU constitutive Act prescribes.  
Whatever the legal position of uti possidetis in Africa and elsewhere, its invocation with 
respect to shared watercourses’ use, outside the context of boundary lines that are needed 
to limit ‘territorial jurisdiction of states,’134 is a misreading of the principle at best, or an 
attempt to evade state sovereignty, which embraces authority over their resources, at worst.     
Yet maintaining Nile status quo is imperative to the peace and stability of the region—
changing the current use of Nile waters without consent of all concerned is therefore not 
only illegitimate but also destabilising.135 Even when one endorses keeping the status quo 
                                                          
130Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000 
 http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf, Art. 4[b]; see also Cairo 
Declaration on Border Disputes among African States legitimising national borders inherited from 
colonial times (Cairo Declaration), OAU, 1964, paras. 1 & 2. 
131 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) Judgment ICJ 1986, p. 
20. 
132 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger) Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf ICJ 2013 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/149/17312.pdf, p. 137, para. 11. 
133 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger) Judgment ICJ Reports 2013, para. 10. 
134 Ratner, S., ‘Drawing Better Line: UTI Possidetis and the Borders of New States’ American 
Journal of International Law Vol. 90(4) pp. 590-624 (1996), p. 602. 
135 Lumumba, P. L. O., ‘The Interpretation of the 1929 Treaty and its Legal Relevance and 
Implications for the Stability of the Region’ African Sociological Review 11(1) pp. 10-24 (2007), 
pp. 7-18. 
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argument the question remains whether such a justification should be followed at the 
expense of the basic rights of others on a shared watercourse.136  
Furthermore, Article iii of the 1902 Nile treaty is seen as an invalid and non-ratified treaty 
by Ethiopia,137 but binding and applicable today by Egypt;138 arguably, the latter’s position 
may be challenged or supported based upon the notion of fundamental change of 
circumstances (also known as rebus sic stantibus) as a ground to terminate or withdraw 
from a treaty obligation, as expressly recognised under article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (CVLT).139 This article has adopted stringent 
requirements such as a change of radical nature and the non-application of rebus sic 
stantibus to boundary treaties, which might support the argument that Ethiopia is not 
entitled to terminate or withdraw from Article iii obligations of the 1902 treaty.140   
                                                          
136 Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 14 December 1962, Resolution 1803 (XVII), 
United Nations General Assembly. 
137 Lie, J. H. S., ‘Supporting the Nile Basin Initiative: A Political Analysis “Beyond the River”’ 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (2010) 
http://www.academia.edu/2243972/Supporting_the_Nile_Basin_Initiative_A_Political_Analysis_B
eyond_the_River, p. 7. 
138 Supra Egyptian Perspective note 5. 
139 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties [VCLT] 1969, UNTS No. 18232. Art. 62 reads: 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the 
time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked 
as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: 
(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the con sent of the parties 
to be bound by the treaty; and 
(b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed 
under the treaty. 
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from a treaty: 
(a) If the treaty establishes a boundary; or 
(b) If the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an 
obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the 
treaty. 
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances 
as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground 
for suspending the operation of the treaty. 
140 Salama, A., ‘The Principle of Fundamental Change in Circumstances and its Impact on the Nile 
Basin Agreements’ African Perspectives Vol. 11(39), pp. 36-40 (2013), pp. 36-40. 
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Yet, decolonisation in Africa and elsewhere and the political and territorial changes in the 
Sudan141 and Ethiopia may arguably challenge the non-application of robus sic stantibus 
as a ground to invalidate Article iii of the 1902 treaty. What seems to be certain, is that the 
developments of the law in the field including the emerging CFA,142 the non-objection by 
Egypt and Sudan of the Tekeze dam143 built and completed in 2009 on one of Nile 
tributaries with an installed capacity of 300mw in electricity and supplies with electricity 
not only to Ethiopia but also to Sudan, and now the GERD and its acceptance by Sudan 
and Egypt, means that either the current situation is fundamentally different144 from what it 
was in 1902, and/or Egypt and Sudan may have wilfully withdrawn, by implication or 
otherwise, their claims,145 and thus, (article iii of) the 1902 Nile Treaty has been 
terminated,146 if not void ab initio. This is a particularly powerful argument as Sudan, on 
whose behalf Article iii was agreed, is now a strong backer of the GERD and other 
dams.147 For the reasons discussed earlier, furthermore, the argument that article iii of the 
treaty forms a boundary treaty in the context of Art 62 of the VCLT is without legal 
validity and might also amount to an abuse of robus sic stantibus.148 This is evident from 
the drafting history of Article 62 with reference to boundary treaties: 
                                                          
141 Supra Woldetsadik note 128, p. 116. 
142 Tvedt, T., The River Nile in the Post-colonial Age: Conflict and Cooperation in the Nile Basin 
Countries (I B Tauris & Co: London, 2009), p. 10; supra McCaffrey note 74, pp. 271-271. 
143 ‘Ethiopia inaugurates Africa’s first ever biggest power dam’ (Sudan Tribune, 14 November, 
2009). 
144 Supra VCLT note 139, Art 62(1)(a)-(b). 
145 Supra Tvedt note 142, pp. 10-11. 
146 Supra VCLT note 139, Art. 59(1). 
147 Eleiba, A., ‘Sudanese president backs Ethiopian dam ahead of Nile talks’ (Ahramonline, 5 
December, 2013) http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/88321/World/Region/Sudanese-
president-backs-Ethiopian-dam-ahead-of-Ni.aspx. 
148 When Art 62 of the CVLT was debated in the UN in 1968 Libya, amongst non-western 
European countries warned that the vague notion of fundamental change of circumstances can be 
abused by states. The USA, amongst others countries was very critical of the concept see Scbwelb, 
E., ‘Fundamental Change of Circumstances’, Comments on the 1968 Draft Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1999) p.47  
http://www.zaoerv.de/29_1969/29_1969_1_c_39_70.pdf  (pp39-70). 
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The 1963 Drafting Committee proposed the formula: “a treaty establishing a territorial 
settlement”, a phrase which like Waldock’s (ILC Special Rapporteur on the VCLT) draft 
was intended to cover not only a transfer of territory itself but also ancillary rights arising 
from the transfer. This proved not to be acceptable to the majority which wished to avoid 
any reference to the grant of territorial rights and to limit the exception to treaties which 
either established a territorial boundary or actually transferred territory.149 
This perhaps provides with a relatively clear indication on the limited scope of ‘boundary 
treaties’ in the context of the exclusion of their application to the robus sic stantibus-based 
invocation of terminating a treaty obligation. 
Even so, and as outlined earlier, dozens of other Nile colonial-era treaties including the 
1959 Nile Treaty concluded between Egypt and Sudan unambiguously aimed at the “full 
utilisation of the Nile waters”150 by both Egypt and Sudan. This Treaty was concluded 
despite the fact that Ethiopia served notice in 1957 that it would pursue unilateral 
development of the Nile water resources within its territory.151  By the same token, the 
1929 Nile Treaty, which was committed by Great Britain on behalf of its east African 
colonies, was rejected not only by Ethiopia but also by Sudan, Tanzania, Burundi and 
Kenya.152 Some gave a grace period of two years from independence to negotiate on the 
fate of Nile and other colonial treaties entered into on their behalf; it was declared that 
                                                          
149 Ibid, p. 55. The ILC did also clarify that ‘By excepting treaties establishing a boundary from its 
(Art 62) scope the present article would not exclude the operation of the principle of self-
determination in any case where the conditions for its legitimate operation existed’ (ibid, p.58). 
150 United Arab Republic and Sudan Agreement (With Annexes) For the Full Utilization of the 
Nile Waters, 8 November 1959. 
151 Supra McCaffrey note 73, p. 269; Degefu, G. T., The Nile: Historical, Legal and Developmental 
Perspectives (Trafford Publishing: New York, 2003), p.99. 
152 Richard K., Paisley, K.R., & Henshaw, W.T., ‘Transboundary governance of the Nile River 
Basin: Past, present and future’ Environmental Development (July 2013) Volume 7, p. 63, 59 
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after the lapse of such a period the treaties are presumed to be terminated. This is often 
referred to as the Nyerere Doctrine153 as further explained in the forthcoming section.  
The following points recap the discussion thus far: The 1902 Nile Treaty coupled with the 
1929 and 1959 colonial-era treaties have been used by both downstream and upstream 
countries to defend their existing monopoly and demand for a fair share of the Nile waters 
respectively.154 However, their validity and current application have been seriously 
challenged. The 1959 Nile Treaty is unique in that it is not a colonial treaty per se, 
although as it was founded on the purpose and object of its predecessor, and a number Nile 
basin countries were still colonised when it was concluded, it can be said that it is closer to 
Nile colonial treaties than contemporary international watercourses law.  Even if these 
treaties are said to still be applicable, the question of their fairness remains. The next 
section therefore analyses the fairness of these treaties and their implications for the 
GERD, in the light of what has been considered so far and other issues of treaty law such 
as the law of succession. 
 
The GERD’s Fairness in the Eyes of Colonial Treaties 
 
As Franck diligently put it: 
                                                          
153Okoth-Owiro, A., ‘State Succession and International Treaty Commitments: A Case Study of the 
Nile Water Treaties’ (Occasional Paper, East Africa # 9, 2004), pp.13-21 
 http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_6306-544-1-30.pdf; as considered later, the Nyerere doctrine was 
named after the position of the first prime minister of independent Tanganyika (later Tanzania), 
Julius Nyerere on the Nile issue; he took the position that Tanganyika is not bound by Nile colonial 
treaties unless the obligations form part of customary international law. Kasimbazi, E.B., ‘The 
impact of colonial agreements on the regulation of the waters of the River Nile’ Water 
International, 35:6, 718-732 ((2010) DOI:10.1080/02508060.2010.533642; supra Salman note 92, 
p. 18. 
154 Supra McCaffrey note 73, p. 270. 
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Achieving a shared perception of fairness is much harder than thinking up a formula, 
but no formula can legitimate a mandatory regime of allocation which is not perceived 
as fair by those whose conduct it is meant to regulate. In this lies the existential 
opportunity, the pragmatic imperative. Fairness is the only basis for allocation on 
which ‘everyone’ is likely to agree.155 
The implications of colonial treaties for the fairness debate and dilemma are now analysed 
with such a powerful quote in mind. Procedurally, Ethiopia is arguably bound by the 1902 
Nile Treaty. Ethiopia was an independent sovereign state who ‘agreed’ not to ‘arrest’ Nile 
waters or construct any projects on the tributaries of the River and thus bound by the 
Treaty.156 However, the circumstances of concluding that Treaty, including its ambiguity, 
subsequent rejection and non-ratification by Ethiopia rendered it void from the outset.157 
Most importantly, the British Empire, as a party to that particular Treaty ceased to exist 
decades ago, thus invoking it today against the GERD is procedurally flawed.  
Egypt and Sudan might argue that they are justified in invoking the 1902 Treaty to oppose 
the GERD as successors of colonial Britain,158 which is supported by the ‘continuity’ 
doctrine of legal commitments.159 The law of treaty succession160 appears to be clear that 
all (bilateral) treaties, especially those which lack universal appeal, are not assumed to be 
succeeded by independent or newly created states, a position supported by the ‘clean state’ 
or ‘non-devolution’ doctrine.161 Most, if not all, Nile basin countries, as former colonies of 
                                                          
155  Supra Franck note 28, p. 13. 
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Britain, rejected Nile colonial-treaties, which comprise the Sudan.162 In particular, the 
1961 Declaration of Tanganyika on succession of the 1929 Treaty articulates both the 
rejection of that treaty imposed on it and on others and the need for starting a fresh process 
based upon negotiation, reciprocity and equity - it reads as below:  
The Government of Tanganyika has come to the conclusion that the provisions of the 
1929 Agreement purporting to apply to the countries ‘under British Administration’ are 
not binding on Tanganyika. At the same time, however, and recognizing the importance 
of the waters of the Nile that have their source in Lake Victoria to the Government and 
peoples of all the riparian states, the Government of Tanganyika is willing to enter into 
discussions with other interested Governments at the appropriate time, with a view to 
formulating and agreeing on measures for the regulation and division of the waters in a 
manner that is just and equitable to all riparian states and of the greatest benefits to all 
their peoples.163 
This position, which is elaborated in procedural and time period terms, as discussed 
earlier, was followed by other countries that were former colonies, and is a strong evidence 
of the ‘clean state’ doctrine of state succession in action. This doctrine may not apply, 
however, to (independent) Ethiopia regarding the 1902 Nile Treaty because it was not 
colonised like the others. Yet the unevenness of the deal between a mighty colonial power 
and a country under exigent threat from different colonial powers makes such an argument 
untenable.164 Conversely, Sudan on whose behalf the 1902 Treaty was concluded was a 
colony of Britain, and thus a beneficiary of the clean state doctrine, an entitlement which 
was exercised by Sudan against the 1929 Nile Treaty.165 Whether Sudan will formally and 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Chazournes, L. B., Leb, C., & Tignino, M., International Law and Freshwater: The Multiple 
Challenges pp. 421-444 (Edward: Cheltenham, 2013), p. 425. 
162 Supra McCaffrey note 73, p. 270. 
163As quoted in supra Mekonnen note 115, p. 434. 
164 Supra Degefu note 151, p. 99. 
165 Supra McCaffrey note 73, p. 269. 
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expressly abandon colonial treaties as a legal basis for its Nile water entitlement remains to 
be seen.166 If Sudan expressly or impliedly renounces the application of the 1902 Nile 
Treaty, however, it will be apparent that Egypt will not have a legitimate ground to rely on 
that Treaty for purposes of objecting to current or future projects upstream, including the 
GERD. It may be said that Egypt (and Sudan) have impliedly renounced the 1902 Nile 
treaty by officially endorsing the GERD; however, this contradiction will remain unless 
the 1902 Treaty is expressly denounced by Egypt as a legal ground to question projects 
upstream.  It is unlikely that the 1959 Nile Treaty is relevant to the law of state succession 
involving other Nile riparians, arguably excepting South Sudan.  It is of note that the law 
of treaty succession was not meant to retain illegal earlier treaties.167  
In a nutshell, these are largely procedural questions ranging from rules of treaty making to 
that of state succession (and uti possidetis), the primary legal basis of which has been the 
1902 Nile Treaty. However, this 104 years old Treaty was not procedurally fair, similar to 
the rest of Nile colonial treaties, and therefore does not provide a sound legal basis to 
reject the GERD as procedurally unfair; this does not inevitably render Article iii of the 
Treaty substantively unfair and the GERD fair.  
Substantively, it is often maintained by some authors aiming to protect the historic use 
‘rights’ of Egypt in particular to which the Nile is seen as lifeblood168 that the 1902 and the 
1929 and 1959 Nile treaties are fair. The desert State’s population heavily rely on this river 
for drinking, fishing, agriculture, hydropower and tourism. However, it is also fair to say 
that Nile colonial-era treaties including the 1902 Treaty, like other colonial treaties, were 
instigated by self-interest of colonial powers rather than shared interest of the community 
of Nile riparian states. For this reason, and despite the claim of pursuing ‘a civilising 
                                                          
166 Supra Salman note 92. 
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mission’, such colonial treaties have been ‘discontinued in international law’ as 
substantively flawed and discriminatory treaties.169 Importantly, the treaties at issue 
conflict with the right to self-determination of peoples in upstream countries and their 
entitlement to fair use and utilisation of the river’s resources, while their tributaries 
contribute every drop of Nile waters, and thus defeat the notion of distributive justice.170 
It appears that the British Empire recognised such injustice as early as the 1950s, and 
began to question the absolute ownership of the Nile by downstream countries, particularly 
by Egypt. The 1959 UK declaration on the subject submits that:  
the territories of British East Africa will need for their development more water than they 
at present use and will wish their claims for more water to be recognised by other states 
concerned. Moreover, they will find it difficult to press ahead with their own 
development until they know what new works downstream States will require on the 
headwaters within British East African Territory. For this reason, the United Kingdom 
Government would welcome an early settlement of the whole Nile waters question.171 
This declaration only concerns Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika, all former colonies of the 
British Empire, but Ethiopia as a legitimate stakeholder in matters of Nile waters was also 
publicly referred to by British authorities as early as 1956. For example, MP James 
Johnson (of Rugby), stressed in parliamentary debate held in May 18, 1956 that  
the enormous significance the future establishment of a Nile Valley Authority could have 
for people, black and white alike, in Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya. It is a 
                                                          
169 Boyle, A., & Chinkin, C., The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2009), pp. 28-29. 
170 Yihdego, Z., The Blue Nile dam controversy in the eyes of international law, Global Water 
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bold and imaginative project. The conservation of the waters of the Nile opens up an 
exciting future for the people of those parts.172 
Although there is no evidence that there was a trace of official policy to address the 
interests of Ethiopia with respect to Nile waters, the aforementioned quote shows that there 
was some discussion about, and recognition of, Ethiopia’s interest in British 
establishments.  
To sum-up, both the downstream and upstream sides of the equation believe, or claimed to 
have believed, in fair use of Nile waters. Their views on the fairness of relevant colonial 
treaties reflect this—the treaties considered above are claimed to be fair to protect historic 
and prior water use, while unfair from upstream countries’ perspectives. This evidences 
the fairness dilemma in sharing and protecting Nile water resources as the very same 
treaties are often relied upon to make a fair use and protect existing use of Nile waters. 
Hence, the treaties at issue are not that helpful to judge the (un)fairness of the GERD as 
fairness is about agreeing on fundamental principles that duly take into account the legal 
rights and interests of all parties. The two post-1990 Nile framework instruments provide 
better insights into the fairness of the GERD, and will therefore be considered next.   
  
Post-1990 Nile Instruments:  a way out from the fairness dilemma? 
 
   The 1993 Framework Instrument 
 
Some legal and political context to this section may be useful here. The Framework for 
General Co-operation between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Ethiopia173 (Framework 
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Instrument) was signed by presidents Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Meles Zenawi of 
Ethiopia in July 1993 in Cairo. In Ethiopia it was a transitional legal and political era 
which was led by a Transitional Government, established under the Transitional Period 
Charter of Ethiopia 1991.174  In contrast, although with its own serious internal challenges 
including Islamic extremism, repression and economic crisis, Egypt was under the 
leadership of a long serving president and (relatively) strong inter alia in its diplomatic, 
institutional and human capacity175 that are crucial to promote a state’s legal and political 
interests. As the detailed discussion will reveal, it is not clear whether the Framework 
Instrument was signed in good faith (also known as bona fides) by the parties to it as 
required by international (watercourses) law.176 Moreover, it is not clear whether it was a 
hastily or a well-thought-out negotiated political/legal undertaking.   
Nevertheless, the Framework Instrument duly signed by the two heads of State  recognised 
the need for realising ‘their full economic and resource potential’ and underlined that both 
have ‘mutual interest’ in the Nile basin.177 The principles of ‘good neighbourliness’, 
‘peaceful settlement of disputes’, ‘non-interference’ in their internal affairs’, ‘mutual trust 
and understanding’, and ‘promoting economic and political interests’, including regional 
stability have been laid out in the Instrument.178 These founding principles were followed 
by substantive and procedural provisions. The latter includes ‘creating appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                                               
173 Framework for General Co-operation between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Ethiopia, 1 July 
1993 http://gis.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/521ENG.pdf. 
174  Negarit Gazeta, 1991-07-22, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 1-5. 
175  Hashim, A., ‘The Egyptian Military, Part Two: From Mubarak Onward’ Middle East Policy 
Council, Winter 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 4. 
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mechanisms’179 for cooperation.  Article 4 of the framework document further spelt out the 
following: 
The two Parties agree that the issue of the use of the Nile waters shall be worked out in 
detail, through discussions by experts from both sides, on the basis of the rules and 
principles of international law.  
This article appears to contain both procedural and substantive elements. The stipulation 
that the use of water is subject to detailed expert study appears to be a procedural 
commitment which ties into the notions of cooperation, creating mechanisms through 
which the two countries and their experts will work together and promote basin-level 
cooperation as reaffirmed under Article 8 of the framework.  
Likewise, the substantive dimension of Article 4 broadly, but vaguely, refers to ‘rules and 
principles of international law.’ Interpreting this phrase can lead to two varied views: on 
the one hand, the rules codified in colonial treaties can be interpreted as relevant rules and 
‘principles’; on the other hand, as in previous sections, customary international 
watercourses law advocates the principle inter alia of equitable and reasonable utilisation 
and participation, rather than a monopoly of use and decision making.  
However, while the instrument does not specifically refer to such principle, Article 5 
endorsed the duty ‘to refrain from engaging in any activity related to the Nile matters that 
may cause appreciable harm to the interests of the other party’. Oddly, this subordinate 
rule to the principle is there while the customary international law umbrella principle, 
equitable use and participation,180 is absent from the instrument. Worthy of mention is that 
Article 7 (1) of the UNWCC refers to the duty to ‘take all appropriate measures to prevent 
the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States’ rather than ‘to refrain from 
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engaging in any activities…’, which arguably makes the latter a more prohibitive and 
restrictive undertaking compared to the 1993 instrument, when read in the light of the 
deliberate or unintended omission of the customary international law principle of equitable 
and reasonable use from the text. Yet, conserving and protecting Nile waters with the aim 
of enhancing the ‘volume of flow and reduce the loss of Nile waters through 
comprehensive and integrated development schemes’ was incorporated under Article 6 of 
the framework.  
This instrument was hailed by some as ’the nascent regime change in the Nile Basin’,181 
which helped in ‘moving them more recently toward more cooperative behaviour;182 given 
the history of rigid water sharing claims in the basin this observation was not without 
merit. However, it is doubtful that, following the adoption of this instrument either Egypt 
was committed to abandoning its historic ‘right’ claims, or Ethiopia abandoned its 
equitable use claims. 
The 1993 instrument is a written commitment signed by two heads of State, which might 
fulfil the definition of a treaty under Article 2 (1) (a) of the VCLT 1969. It was also later 
registered with the UN Secretariat.183 To Mohamod Abdo,184 the agreement ‘merely 
represents the first attempt by the two states to come together, and does not have a binding 
effect. It is no more than the heralding of a new era of improved relations between the two 
states with regard to the water of the Nile.’185 To Shetewy, in contrast, ‘Ethiopia had 
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ratified’ the Agreement and ‘pledged not to violate Egypt’s historical rights.’186 It is not 
clear whether the word ‘ratified’ was used here by Shetewy in its technical and legal sense 
but a president cannot ratify a treaty in accordance with the Ethiopian Constitution.  
As per Article 14 of the VCLT, the binding nature of such ‘less formal agreements’ 
depends on the intention of the parties to be bound by them under international law.187 The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) applies an ‘objective test’ in determining whether a 
document gives rise to legal rights and duties under international law, taking into account 
‘its actual terms and … the particular circumstances in which it was drawn up.’188 In the 
present case the formulation of an intention of both sides can hardly be deduced from the 
text to evidently support or reject either Shetewy’s or Abdo’s arguments. However, 
Abdo’s argument makes sense in that, unlike the 2015 DoPs, the commitment at issue 
lacks specific rights and duties including some references to dispute resolution.  
Yet the instrument was registered with the UN in 2010,189 in accordance with Article 102-
(1) of the UN Charter, which states that ‘every treaty and every international agreement 
entered into by any Member of the United Nations…shall as soon as possible be registered 
with the Secretariat and published by it.’190 Unlike the League of Nations Covenant,191 
however, non-registration of an agreement does not decide its binding or non-binding 
nature.192 The ICJ and other UN organs do not consider registration of an instrument when 
dealing with cases involving agreements concluded between states.193 It follows that the 
Secretariat generally registers an agreement when submitted to it by any one of the parties, 
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187 Crawford, J., Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8 ed., Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2012), pp. 372-273. 
188 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v Turkey) ICJ Repts 1978, p. 3, para. 39. 
189 Supra 1993 Framework Instrument note 183. 
190 (italics added). 
191 (League of Nations Covenant, Art 18). 
192 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Art. 102-Sub-(2). 
193 Martens, E., ‘Article 102, in, Simma, B., et al, The United Nations Charter: Commentary 3rd 
ed. Volume 2 pp. 2098-2109 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012), p. 2109. 
42 
 
without making a judgement on the nature of that instrument.194 In light of this the 
registration of the 1993 instrument by the UN upon Egypt’s request may give rise to two 
viewpoints. On the one hand, Egypt meant it to be a binding commitment. The fact that it 
was relied upon to oppose the GERD reinforces this position.195 On the other hand, 
Ethiopia neither backed (nor opposed) its registration with the UN nor has it ratified it 
before its parliament. The move to register the instrument by Egypt after the lapse of 17 
years arguably poses questions of good faith and might not be in compliance with the ‘as 
soon as possible’ precondition of Article 102 (1) of the Charter. Even if it was registered in 
good faith there was no shared understanding between the parties on the legal character of 
the instrument.  
Assuming that it was binding, it is highly unlikely that it gives rise to specific legal duties 
and entitlements196 as it was broadly construed and not supported by follow-up 
commitments. Again, if one concludes that it creates legal obligations, it follows that both 
sides might have violated it as further considered below. Worthy of note is the point that 
framework agreements must not be confused with framework conventions such as the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992. These are legally 
binding frameworks,197 whereas framework agreements do not normally require formal 
ratification,198 the binding nature of which can only be determined on a case-by-case-basis. 
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197 Hossain, K., ‘The Environmental Law-Making Process’, in, Alam, S., et al., Routledge 
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To recap, the 1993 instrument, different from what some hoped for, was an unfinished and 
vague law-making endeavour, which is selectively relied upon later by the parties to blame 
each other. Despite the ambiguity over its hard or soft law nature it was an important 
commitment and part of a law-making process;199 it has endorsed general principles, 
aspirations and positive spirit of cooperation, which arguably and fundamentally differ 
from colonial-era Nile treaties and thus impact upon the fairness of the GERD. This 
assertion requires further consideration but prior to doing so, the March 2015 DoPs has 
been considered in order to engage with the fairness or otherwise of the two post-1990 
instruments more generally, and with the most current one more specifically. 
 
 The Declaration of Principles 2015 
 
The DoPs, by contrast to the 1993 instrument, is a tripartite commitment signed by Egypt, 
Ethiopia and Sudan in March 5, 2015. It provides a relatively detailed insight into the 
opportunities and challenges of the sharing of water resources in the Eastern Nile basin.200 
The interest here is to look into the connotations of the instrument to the fairness of the 
GERD. The general and specific principles on which the Declaration is founded are briefly 
articulated first to help understand the fairness analysis.  
The DoPs aspires to promote the ‘common interest’ of, and cooperation among, the 
signatories, based, inter alia, on ‘sovereign equality’, ‘principles of international law’, 
‘good faith’, ‘optimal use’ and ‘protection of the river.’201 The ‘Principle of Development, 
Regional Integration and Sustainability’ further recognised that: 
                                                          
199 Supra Boyle & Chinkin, note 169, pp. 211-14; Van Hoof, G. J. H., Rethinking the Sources of 
International Law (Kluwer: Berlin, 1983), pp. 187-189. 
200 Supra Salman note 15. 
201 Supra DoPs note 12, Arts. i, ix. 
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The purpose of the GERD is for power generation, to contribute to economic 
development, promotion of transboundary cooperation and regional integration through 
generation of sustainable development and reliable clean energy supply.202 
This is reinforced by the principles of equitable use and no significant harm as enshrined in 
articles iii [a-j] and iv respectively. The content of both principles is almost identical with 
the UNWCC and the CFA notwithstanding some differences in the factors that are 
required to apply the equitable use principle. While the aspirations and some of the 
principles are to be found in the 1993 Nile instrument, the DoPs took pains to not only 
recognise a mega dam by a Nile upstream country but also to endorse fundamental 
principles of international watercourses law.203  
These general principles are followed by a series of specific principles and practical 
commitments among which is the principle of dam safety,204 which aims to prevent 
significant harm on Sudan and Egypt the distinct standing of which (from the no-
significant harm rule) is debatable. Worthy of noting is that while the Berlin Rules205 and 
some domestic legislation206 regard dam safety as a normative rule, the Helsinki Rules, and 
most importantly the UNWCC, do not explicitly mention dam safety. The World 
Commission on Dams, stressing building dams as a sovereign matter, recommended that 
the issue of dam building be handled within existing principles and rules of international 
watercourses law including the equitable use, no significant harm, good faith negotiations, 
                                                          
202 Ibid, Art. Ii. 
203 Ibid, sec. 3.3. 
204 Ibid, Art. Viii. 
205 Ibid, Arts. 32, 34. 
206 See e.g. Act to amend the National Dam Safety Program Act to reauthorize the national dam 
safety program, and for other purposes, 22 December 2006, Public Law 109-460 [USA] 
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cooperation and the use of an expert panel for addressing concerns when required.207 From 
this and whether or not dam safety is a (distinct) legal, as opposed to a policy, principle of 
international watercourses law, there is no doubt that it is a crucial part of the due diligence 
or the duty to take measures to prevent significant harm.  
Of course, if an emergency208 arises relating to a dam in a shared watercourse, as per 
Article 28 (3) of the UNWCC 
A watercourse State within whose territory an emergency originates shall, in 
cooperation with potentially affected States and, where appropriate, competent 
international organisations, immediately take all practicable measures necessitated by the 
circumstances to prevent, mitigate and eliminate harmful effects of the emergency. 
This appears to reiterate the duties enshrined in Article 7 (2) of the UNWCC, when a 
significant harm has been caused, as considered early. It might be presumed that natural or 
man-made emergencies cause, or most likely to cause, significant harm, if they occur; it is, 
therefore, natural to expect a swift action to prevent human, socio-economic and natural 
disaster.  
The other principle the DoPs has adopted is ‘the principle to cooperate on the First Filling 
and Operation of the Dam.’209 This is accompanied by institutional and implementation 
mechanisms which include the establishment and use of national, joint and international 
bodies such as the IPoE and consultancy firms. Such technical and institutional 
                                                          
207 Salman, S., "Dams, International Rivers, and Riparian States: An Analysis of the 
Recommendations of the World Commission on Dams." American University International Law 
Review 16, no. 6 (2001): 1477-1505. See pp 1487-1503. For more discussion on human health and 
safety issues in the context of the primacy of the rule of significant harm see Supra Dellapenna 
note 77, p.283. 
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poses an imminent threat of causing, serious harm to watercourse states or other states and that 
results suddenly from natural causes, such as floods, the breaking up of ice, landslides or 
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mechanisms are indeed vital to effective cooperation in matters of transboundary rivers.210 
Information and data exchange has also been considered as a principle which ought to be 
honoured ‘in good faith and in a timely manner.’211  However, the principle of confidence 
building through electric power sharing, with priority of power supply being given to 
Sudan and Egypt,212 appears to be alien to the UNWCC, the Helsinki and Berlin Rules and 
the CFA, but not necessarily to transboundary water management frameworks.213 
Before looking at the connotations of the principles enshrined in the DoPs to the fairness 
question, the following general points recap what has been considered thus far. First, the 
DoPs is founded on current legal thinking in the field to a greater extent than the 1993 
instrument, which makes it distinct from old Nile treaties.214 Such current principles are 
translated into detailed commitments of cooperation, including on dam safety, filling and 
operation and energy/benefit sharing. Finally, the principles at issue appear to have been 
formulated in such a way to apply to the entire Nile as far as the use of Nile waters within 
respective territories of the parties is concerned. However, the legal status of the DoPs is 
unclear. 
The binding nature of the DoPs depends on the content, wording and the intention of the 
parties to it.215 Generally, it is a question of whether a written declaration made by two or 
more states ‘generate a normative commitment—a shared expectation of future behaviour 
whether in terms of a change from the status quo or a continuation of existing 
behaviour.’216 Even if a declaration does not constitute a binding treaty, it can reaffirm 
                                                          
210 Supra McCaffrey note 73, p. 511. 
211 Supra DoPs, note 12, Art. Vii. 
212 Ibid, Art.vi. 
213 Allan, J. A., & Mirumachi, N., ‘Why Negotiate? Asymmetric Endowments, Asymmetric Power 
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Earle, A., Ja ̈gerskog, A., & O ̈jendal, J., Transboundary Water Management: Principles and 
Practice pp. 13-26 (Earthscan: London, 2010), p. 22. 
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established principles and customary rules of international law, and thus be declaratory of 
legal duties and rights of states. Examples of such instruments include the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights 1948217 and the Declaration on the Friendly Relations 
between States 1970,218 both of which are widely regarded as authoritative sources or an 
affirmation of existing law.219 Similarly, bilateral or trilateral declarations may be legally 
binding, depending on their details and circumstances of conclusion.220 The ICJ in the 
Cameroon/Nigeria221 2002 boundary delimitation case endorsed a declaration as a legal 
instrument despite some technical shortcomings.222 
In this context, three opposing arguments are considered with respect to the legal character 
of the GERD’s DoPs. The first argues that the DoPs, similar, if not identical, to the 1993 
instrument, is a soft law (which is not binding) rather than a hard law (which is legally 
binding) instrument. The absence of formal phrases including a clause on entry into force, 
ratification and deposit as stipulated in Art 24 (4) of the VCLT can be cited as evidence to 
support this. The Ethiopian Parliament has not ratified the Declaration, which is similar to 
their practice with the 1993 engagement. Neither the Egyptian House of Representatives223 
                                                          
217 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 10 December 1948, Resolution 217 A(III), United 
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following their publication in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
48 
 
nor the Sudanese National Legislature224 have approved the DoPs as required by both 
constitutions. Importantly, the Egyptian Constitution 2014225 maintains ‘Egypt’s [Nile] 
historic rights’, which appears to be in conflict with the principles enshrined in the DoPs. 
Egypt and Sudan have not either formally denounced Nile colonial-era treaties226 or 
justified their compatibility with the DoPs. Certainly, colonial-era treaties227 appear to be 
in conflict with the DoPs, the equitable utilisation principle therein in particular.228 These 
are among the indications and circumstances that appear to suggest that the parties did not 
mean it to be a normative commitment.  
In contrast, the second argument submits that the DoPs is a hard law agreement which 
must be honoured in ‘good faith.’229 Such legal agreements do not necessarily need to be 
ratified by parliament to have international legal effect as ascertaining the intention to be 
bound by a treaty is determined and ‘governed by international law.’230  In the DoPs case, 
the intention of the parties can be inferred from the document itself. At the outset, the title 
of the instrument refers to ‘agreement’, which is different from the 1993 framework 
instrument. The Declaration not only sets out or reaffirms existing legal principles that are 
adopted in conventional and customary international law but also specific commitments 
some with immediate effect. This was one of the reasons why the ICJ ruled in support of 
                                                          
224 Sudan's Constitution of 2005. Art 58 (1) (k). 
225 The Constitutional provision states that: ‘The state commits to protecting the Nile River, 
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Bahrain’s argument that minutes of a meeting constituted a binding agreement.231 It is 
established in international law that ‘a state may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justifications for its failure to perform a treaty.’232  From this, Ethiopia, Sudan and 
Egypt could not rely on their respective constitutions to not honour their commitments 
enshrined in the DoPs.  
Furthermore, the reference to ‘dispute settlement’ and ‘interpretation’ of the agreement in 
accordance with ‘the principle of good faith’ (which borrowed the language of Art 26 of 
VCLT) is further evidence that the parties meant it to create legal rights and duties, 
although judicial and arbitral methods have not been referred to in the instrument. What 
methods of dispute settlement states adopt is a matter for states; which is why the selective 
approach taken by the DoPs may not show an intention not to be bound by the DoPs as a 
matter of law. Finally, the wording used to articulate the principles including ‘shall’ rather 
than ‘would’ or ‘will’, relating to the core principles enshrined in Articles 3 (equitable 
principle), 4 (not inflicting significant harm) and 7 (data exchange), amongst others is a 
sound textual evidence of intention to be bound by the terms and commitments. Unless 
this was caused by a bad drafting of the text, or a bad translation from the original 
languages, say from Arabic to English,233 these terms appear to connote a hard law 
instrument.   
These assertions may well be challenged by the fact that the two downstream countries 
believe in the application of Nile colonial treaties which are not formally renounced (or 
upheld) in the DoPs. However, a state does not need to officially denounce prior legal 
commitments in order to endorse or reject a subsequent legal commitment as past treaties 
can be put aside or abrogated through the adoption of subsequent legal commitments on 
                                                          
231 Supra Qatar v Bahrain note 220. 
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the same subject matter.234 Such an abrogation of old Nile treaties based on the doctrine of 
lex prior can be justified and necessary for progressive development of the law.235  
The third argument avoids, but also supplements, the two extreme views and submits that, 
whether hard or soft law, the DoPs is a declaratory and endorsement of modern principles 
and rules of existing customary international law, and those principles and rule, as 
reflected in the DoPs would be binding upon the parties. Even if the DoP itself is not 
legally binding upon the parties, the official endorsement of principles and rules of 
international law (by Egypt and Sudan in particular) can be seen as evidence of an 
emerging consensus in the Eastern-Nile basin to make an initial deal on the GERD and 
beyond based upon contemporary international law. 
The question of implementing or disregarding the DoPs and associated undertakings as 
consensual commitments is a difficult one to deal with. One possible answer is that the 
commitments are not implemented and respected as the anticipated studies to be carried 
out by the French firm are delayed while the construction of the dam is ongoing.236 The 
other possible answer is that the parties to the DoPs are implementing and reaffirming their 
commitments. It can be argued that the delays caused by technical and administrative 
challenges that the three countries and the firms have been facing do not necessarily tell 
the tale of disregarding the commitments. For instance, the DoPs itself acknowledges that 
‘the Three Countries appreciate the efforts undertaken thus far by Ethiopia in 
implementing the IPoE recommendations pertinent to the GERD(‘s) safety.’237 This 
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endorsement is important because the DoPs refers to the need for implementing the 
recommendations of the IPoE. Furthermore, the three countries adopted the December 
2015 Khartoum minutes which reaffirmed their commitments to the DoPs led to: (a) the 
selection of two French firms to conduct the required studies and a British law firm to 
administer the contract between the parties; (b) adopting an Annex which contains the 
‘roadmap and plans for the studies’; and (c) to an agreement that a regular meeting at 
ministerial level continues to expedite the process.238  Most importantly, Article 5 of the 
Khartoum minutes  
  dealt with confidence-building and stated that the three countries agree to support and 
encourage efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures so as to enhance 
people-to-people relations of the three countries. Accordingly, Ethiopia invited 
parliamentarians, the media, and public diplomacy groups of both Egypt and Sudan to 
visit the GERD.239 
In September 2016, these developments were followed by the signing of a contract 
between the three countries and BRLi Group and Artelia regarding the studies to be carried 
out regarding the impacts and hydrology of the GERD.240 According to an Egyptian 
newspaper, Ahramonline, the meeting that led to the signing of the contract 
 was conducted in a very friendly and warm environment and reflected the cooperation 
among the three countries and all in attendance expressed their support and appreciation 
for the efforts exerted by the three countries.241 
However, whether the impact studies to be carried by the two French firms will arrive 
before or after the completion of the GERD remains to be seen. It is most likely that the 
two turbines (out of 16) of the GERD might commence generating electricity before the 
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arrival of the studies/reports in the next couple of months. Even if they will not be used 
for, or help with, the actual construction of the dam, they may still be valuable for dealing 
with reservoir filling242 and operating of the dam. 
From an Egyptian (and possibly Sudanese) perspective it might be argued that the 
continuation of GERD’s construction, without considering the outcomes of the 
forthcoming studies disregards Ethiopia’s commitment to the DoPs. From the Ethiopian 
perspective, however, this assumption has several defects. First, the outcome of the studies 
may or may not have any implication for the way in which Salini is constructing the 
GERD; secondly, demanding a halt of construction because of technical and administrative 
hurdles will be very costly to Ethiopia; thirdly, the delays on commencing the studies 
cannot be attributed to Ethiopia alone—all the parties including the private firms have 
contributed to the delays243 in one way or the other; fourthly, there is no evidence that the 
DoPs was agreed in the spirit that the construction of the dam was conditional upon the 
studies contemplated to be carried; as the ICJ in the Pulp Mills case specifically 
pronounced the position of the law on this stating that suspension (of the Pulp Mills 
project) is only possible “in conformity with the provisions of the treaty” or “by consent of 
all the parties;”244  and finally, as the Dams Commission hints, it may not be equitable and 
reasonable to halt the GERD project simply because there is a delay in forthcoming studies 
by foreign firms which are not of binding character. Some of these issues will be revisited 
when the DoPs’ connotations to the fairness principle are considered later.  
To recap, the parties have not only come up with solid agreement of principles but they are 
also implementing, or trying to implement, the commitments adopted in the DoPs, 
although the process does not appear to be a smooth ride. Regardless of the validity of the 
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various scenarios drawn on the legal status of the instrument, the DoPs evidences the 
beginning, but not the end, of a new era —whether that era is that of fairness or status quo 
ante depends on the appreciation and interpretation of the commitments made in the 
instrument.  
 
GERD’s Fairness in the Eyes of post-1990 Commitments:  
 
The objective of this section is to tackle the fairness of damming the Blue Nile and its 
implications for cooperation from the perspective of non-colonial-era commitments. While 
the DoPs offers solid perspectives on distributive justice aspect of fairness, the 1993 
instrument poses more procedural questions as the next section exhibits.  
 
 GERD’s Procedural Fairness 
 
The 1993 instrument was among the grounds relied upon either to challenge or justify the 
procedural fairness of the GERD. Shetewy, for example, impliedly argues against the 
construction of the GERD on the ground that Ethiopia, as well as Egypt, has, in the 1993 
instrument, pledged to conduct consultations and establish joint mechanisms and studies 
for using Nile waters.245 According to this position, thus, Ethiopia has ‘failed’ to comply 
with these pledges and therefore infringed procedural fairness.  
From an Egyptian perspective, furthermore, Ethiopia did not comply with the procedural 
duty of prior notification and consultation concerning technical data and potential impact 
of the GERD before commencing construction. This is particularly true if it was thought 
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that the project may have a significant adverse effect on the downstream states.246 As a 
matter of law, Ethiopia only have to notify if its planed project ‘may have a significant 
adverse effect upon other watercourse States’, as expressly enshrined in Art 12 of the 
UNWCC. Although the duty to notify does not equate to the right to veto a planned 
project, it is said that it has attained either a general principle or a customary law status in 
the field of watercourses law.247  
Given that this is a procedural duty, however, it is normally and primarily applied within a 
treaty framework.248 Most importantly, in situations where two or more basin states are not 
parties to relevant international, basin-level or bilateral agreements that oblige to notify on 
planned projects, and non-notification is the norm rather than the exception in relations 
among co-riparians,249 the application of the  principles of  reciprocity and equity to such 
situations ought not be ignored.250 As the P.C.I.J. put it: 
It would seem to be an important principle of equity that where two parties have 
assumed an identical or a reciprocal obligation, one party which is engaged in a 
continuing non-performance of that obligation should not be permitted to take 
advantage of a similar non-performance of that obligation by the other party.251 
In this respect, what Egypt had demanded was what it has never given to Ethiopia and 
other upstream countries. The planned project to build the Aswan High Dam was not 
shared with Ethiopia. Most significantly, Egypt never consulted with or shared the benefits 
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of the South Valley Toshka scheme, (as well as Al Salam Canal, designed to divert the 
Nile to Sinai) with upstream countries.252 The Aswan Dam issue may only be of historical 
significance here. The South Valley/Toshka scheme, in contrast, began in 1997, after the 
signing of the 1993 instrument, and meant to expand Egypt’s irrigated land by ‘up to 
3200sq.km’ and has the capacity of accommodating around six million Egyptians.253 This 
is a new and ongoing development which reinforces the prior apportionment claim by 
Egypt over Nile waters, which requires an additional 5-10 billion cubic meters of Nile 
waters.254 Without going into the polemics of the impact of this project on the Nile river 
system, the facts that occurred before and after the 1993 instrument speak for themselves 
concerning the unjustifiability of Egypt’s attempt to object to the GERD on the basis of 
not being notified and consulted about it during planning.  
Yet the duty to notify and consult is seen as customary law,255 hence, of an erga omnes 
character owed to all Nile basin countries—its violation by Egypt with respect to the 
Aswan Dam or its most recent project does not justify Ethiopia’s ‘failure’ to notify and 
consult with Egypt. The problem of such a noble but ‘rigid’ application of a procedural 
rule without sufficient account of practices and behaviours of riparian states in a particular 
river basin context would run contrary to what the P.C.I.J. termed the principles of 
reciprocity and equity, that require equal treatment and expectation of all basin states in 
applying legal rules and principles.256 Furthermore, if a riparian state invokes a violation of 
a procedural rule of international law by another co-riparian state, whilst itself is engaged 
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in violating the same rule, that conduct may amount to abuse of rights and processes257 and 
thus unjust. This is further strengthened by the fact that Ethiopia strongly believes in the 
absence of a significant risk of harm to downstream countries as a result of its dam project.     
It is doubtful that the doctrine of abuse of rights or processes exists in international law,258 
and thus the rule of prior notification or consultation, as enshrined in article 11 of the 
UNWCC ought to be adhered to strictly, disregarding the peculiar complexities of the 
practices and contentions over shared Nile water. If this line of argument holds true both 
Egypt and Ethiopia would be responsible for not honouring their respective commitments 
not to engage in Nile planned projects without a joint study and prior notification and 
consultation, as can be broadly inferred from the 1993 instrument; notwithstanding the 
controversy surrounding the binding nature of the instrument.  Furthermore, as the ICJ in 
the Pulp Mills case affirmed every State’s duty ‘not to allow knowingly its territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.’259  It follows from this that ‘a State is 
…obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place 
in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the 
environment of another State.’ 260  This is termed by the Court as the duty of prevention 
the implementation of which is reliant on cooperation between concerned parties. The duty 
to inform/notify ‘allows for the initiation of (such) co-operation.’261 This due diligence 
expectation may therefore apply to both Ethiopia and Egypt.    
Egypt may also be found responsible for breaking the 1993 instrument as the statements 
made during the Morsi era and for early reports that indicate the plans and ‘determination’  
of Egypt to use military force, or threat of force, subversion and the likes to halt the 
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GERD’s construction;262 these may have contravened ‘the  principles of good 
neighbourliness, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states.’263 Such Egyptian conduct also defeats the core of UN Charter and AU 
commitments of the Country as deploying, or threatening to deploy, military force to 
promote economic or other interests of a state is firmly prohibited in contemporary 
international law.264 Yet it was/is not clear whether the threatening statements made by 
Egyptian politicians in particular where mere political rhetoric or steps taken as part of a 
concrete and planned state action.265 In recent months, however, ‘Ethiopia has accused 
Egypt and Eritrea of destabilizing its stability by supporting outlawed rebels and stoking 
an unprecedented wave of protests that has led the government to declare a six-month state 
of emergency,’266 an allegation swiftly denied by Egypt.267 
Such accusations and counter-accusations on past and recent events are less likely to help 
promote genuine cooperation among the parties, which is the prime objective of a fair 
process. In part, therefore, this discussion may be academic and obsolete. Furthermore, the 
1993 instrument offers far beyond the two main issues discussed thus far, the general ban 
on the use of Nile waters and prior notification as procedural matters. For instance, both 
sides agreed to ‘create appropriate mechanism[s] for periodic consultations’268 and most 
importantly, they committed themselves to work ‘towards a framework for effective 
cooperation among countries of the Nile Bain.’269 These are positive commitments which 
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might have contributed to the endeavour made to establish the NBI, and ultimately the 
CFA.  
Undoubtedly, the DoPs has opened a new chapter of cooperation, and provides a 
comprehensive insight into the procedural fairness of the GERD.  Before dealing with the 
fairness of the adoption and implementation processes of the DoPs, a background 
discussion on the design of the project is desirable to see to what extent GERD’s initial 
processes were participatory of relevant stakeholders in accordance with internationally 
acceptable standards. The Dam’s Commission rightly states that: 
  Large dams arise from a series of decisions taken from the beginning of the planning 
process through to the final approval of a project and financial closure. At each stage 
different actors are involved, including government agencies, public or private utilities, 
interested parties from the region, financing agencies, consulting and construction 
companies and equipment suppliers. Affected people and NGOs are increasingly 
involved as well.’270 
The GERD appear to have secured the participation of most, if not all, these actors and 
their vital roles in the process of designing and planning the project. The following three 
points demonstrate this. First, building upon previous studies, the government conducted a 
serious of studies including dam design, environmental and socio-economic impact 
assessment, initial transboundary environmental impact assessment and flood analysis.271. 
The IPoE, it its 2013 report, confirmed, for example, that the content and structure of the 
environmental impact assessment conducted to identify the impacts of the GERD on 
Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt met the standards of international financial institutions272. 
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Similarly, the hydrological study on flood analysis was generally acceptable.273  The Panel 
has also made recommendations as further elaborated in relation to implementation of the 
project and the DoPs.  
Secondly, the Geotechnical Mission Report274 prepared by the contractor, Salini, was also 
said to be of an internationally acceptable quality by the IPoE. Salini is not the only 
European company that is involved in the GERD’s design and implementation.  Alstom, a 
French company, has signed 250 million Euro worth contract in 2013 with the state-owned 
Metals & Engineering Corporation (METEC), to supply all GERD turbines, other 
electrical equipment and supervise their installation.275 The Chinese have been part of the 
design and execution of building transmission lines from the GERD to the national grid276 
too.  
Thirdly, the GERD was designed to be financed by the Ethiopian government and the 
public which makes it a unique self-funded mega project, free of foreign loan or aid. The 
Ethiopian public both at home and abroad was made aware of the commencement of the 
project including on the modality of financing the project. As will be seen in a while, 
despite some legitimate questions and doubts by some quarters, Ethiopians and foreign 
citizens of Ethiopian origin have rallied around financing and supporting the GERD 
project.277 This includes those who are, or will be, displaced278 by the project. Ethiopian 
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local and international civil and professional societies firmly support(ed) the initiation of 
the GERD279 while the US-based, International Rivers opposed it from the outset.  
However, the two downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan did not participate in the design 
of the GERD. The procedural fairness of the initiation of the GERD might therefore be 
doubted. The unilateral nature of the dam project which was initiated in the absence of 
relevant treaty regime between the three countries might justify the non-participation of 
the two key stakeholders at the beginning. Although the size of the GERD is much bigger 
than previous plans, it might be argued that Egypt and Sudan participated in previous 
planning and design of a dam which was intended to be built on the Blue Nile within the 
NBI framework.280 Furthermore, even if the procedural fairness of the beginning of the 
GERD is characterised by this likely ‘weakness’, the three aforementioned points broadly 
affirm that the initial process was not only participatory but also founded on scientific 
studies and processes involving internationally (and nationally) recognised actors. Most 
importantly, fairness is a process, and might not begin as a perfect one. And also the two 
downstream countries were later ‘invited in good faith … to review the design documents 
of the GERD,’281 with the purpose of building trust and confidence among the three 
eastern Nile countries. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the DoPs by the three countries seems to have rectified what 
was missing at the design level by making links between issues of design and other studies 
and implementation of the Declaration, as shall be addressed in a moment. The question is, 
however, was the adoption of the DoPs fair?  The series of meetings held among the three 
countries were attended by representatives of the three countries at technical, ministerial 
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and head of state/government levels,282 and therefore mirror equality, serious exchange of 
ideas and a sprite of cooperation. The negotiations have provided the parties with 
opportunities to exchange their hopes and fears and also make compromises, as can be 
shown from the DoPs itself—for example, Ethiopia agreed to use the GERD for energy 
generation purposes and give electric sale priority to Sudan and Egypt, while the two 
downstream countries have made unprecedented move to endorse contemporary principles 
of international watercourses law. This is further evidence that the adoption of the DoPs 
arguably is a result of a fair process. What is clear at this point is that the legality of the 
construction of the GERD has become uncontentious. Indeed, the dam has been seen as an 
opportunity to foster development and integration.283 This does not close the question of 
fair and legitimate adoption and participation, however.  
It is contended that Ethiopia has forced Egypt (and not Sudan) to agree on the construction 
and operation of the dam as a fait accompli.284 It appears from the terms of DoPs itself,285 
earlier statements made by Egyptian officials and from the major shift of position shown  
that Egypt might have made an informed decision to support, or even to participate in 
jointly building, the GERD286 as beneficial to its water, energy and other geo-political 
interests; this is of course conditional, amongst others, upon agreed dam filling and 
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operation policy.287  To Sudan, in contrast, ‘backing the dam project is not a political 
stance, but rather a belief in its benefits for all Nile Basin states’288.  This belief of 
president Omar Al-Bashir is shared by scholars with specific reference to the benefits of 
the dam to Sudan.289 
Ethiopia, for its part, as a good example of compliance with its due diligence duty to take 
‘all appropriate measures’ to prevent harm,290 went to the extent of inviting Egypt and 
Sudan to establish a Tripartite Joint Commission and an IPoE to follow up the construction 
of the GERD and associated issues arising from its design, construction and operation, 
with the purpose of ensuring downstream participation in pre-and-post project completion 
policy and operational matters. This was also commended by the IPoE.291 However, 
despite undertaking internal and (initial) transboundary environmental (and social) impact 
assessments that were said to have met international funding agencies’ standards, the IPoE 
recommended that further studies are needed to elaborate on some of the studies conducted 
with emphasis on downstream impacts.292 Ethiopia accepted to strengthen its studies. 
Despite varied interpretations of the findings and recommendations of the IPoE report, the 
parties recognise Ethiopia’s efforts to ‘implementing the IPoE recommendations’.293  As 
considered previously the contract signed between the three countries and the two French 
firms is intended to follow up the suggestions made by the IPoE.  
The parties have now agreed ‘to cooperate on the first filling and operation’ of the 
GERD,294 the details of which will be informed by the IPoE report, joint studies and 
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decision of the three countries;295 joint technical national committees and a Committee of 
Water (and Foreign) Ministers are empowered to deal with this crucial task. The reference 
to the Heads of State (or Government) of the three countries as ultimate arbitrators in case 
a dispute arises is an important mechanism for fully and flexibly implementing the 
Declaration. The Dam’s Commission Guidelines on dam related disputes refer, however, 
to ‘good faith negotiations or independent dispute resolution procedures.’296 Political 
methods of dispute settlement are certainly more flexible, swift and less costly, when 
undertaken in good faith and spirit of cooperation, compared to legal or other independent 
methods of dispute settlement.   
In brief, the DoPs secured consensus of the three eastern Nile basin countries on the 
continuing construction of the GERD and the way in which it will be filled, operated, and 
the benefits shared—an exemplary practice promoting procedural fairness in the use of 
shared water resources such as Nile waters. The project design and implementation have 
also involved various actors---government agencies, the three countries, contractors and 
suppliers, foreign consultancy firms and communities, although not without shortcomings. 
Translating such key consensual commitments and processes into distributive justice is a 
necessary but difficult exercise, as the next section will show.  
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GERD’s Distributive Fairness  
Some Key General Issues 
Contrary to questions of GERD’s procedural fairness, which appears to have been put to 
rest in March 2015, evaluating the distributive justice impacts of GERD based upon the 
two post-1990 instruments is much more intricate. Undoubtedly, the 1993 engagement 
conveys, in incomplete terms, a message of distributive justice on the sharing of Nile 
resources, which may be used to support or question the fairness of the GERD. The 
instrument provides the commitment to cooperate on advancing ‘economic and political 
interests’ of both sides.297 This must be read in conjunction with the term ‘mutual interest’ 
which is repeatedly referred to as a foundation for their cooperation on Nile and other 
matters. Furthermore, conserving and protecting Nile waters by enhancing ‘the volume of 
flow and reduce the loss of Nile waters’298 constitutes one of the core commitments. The 
engagement also reaffirms the prevention of causing ‘appreciable harm’.299 By endorsing 
the interests of both parties, these basic commitments broadly advance some of the 
requirements of distributive justice, which also take into account preserving Nile waters as 
duly considered hitherto. However, the instrument offers almost nothing with respect to 
substantive water use rights of the parties, and thus is not a complete instrument for 
fostering distributive justice.  
Egypt relied on the appreciable harm clause inter alia of the 1993 commitment to argue 
that the GERD will be detrimental to its agriculture, fisheries, and hydropower and harm to 
the natural environment.300 If substantiated, this claim would make the GERD at odds with 
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distributive justice. Ethiopia strongly contests this and sees the dam as beneficial in 
regulating flooding, slit, increasing Blue Nile flows and reducing evaporation loses from 
the Aswan dam and other storage dams in Sudan thus promoting some of the terms of the 
1993 instrument. All these assertions including the clean energy generation and sharing 
promote mutual interest and a ‘win-win’ situation among the parties, and thus do justice 
rather than harm.301 Different from the 1993 instrument, however, the DoPs has adopted 
ten general and specific principles of international (watercourses) law as considered earlier 
that laid down fundamentals of a fair deal for all concerned, which is entirely different 
from old Nile treaties and practices. The DoPs, building upon the core principles, attempts 
to balance conflicting interests. Ethiopia’s right to use the river for hydropower generation 
is firmly endorsed. In fact, the DoPs recognises the dam as a drive for regional integration 
and sustainable development. However, it barred the dam from being used for irrigation 
purposes, which provides a ‘symbolic’ guarantee to Egypt and Sudan. In addition to such a 
bar, Ethiopia has agreed to share the benefits of the GERD by giving priority of exporting 
electricity to Sudan and Egypt. By this account, the GERD’s fruits will be shared by the 
three and other Nile riparian countries and thus appear to be in line with the notion of 
‘broadly conceived equity.’302  
However, Mohamed Nasreddin reportedly criticised the DoPs inter alia for not clearly 
referring to Egypt’s historic rights and past agreements including the 1902 Nile treaty.303 
Conversely, Minga Negash et al304 argue that ‘the [DoPs] clauses are designed to re-assert 
the 1929 and 1959 water sharing agreements’ including the 1993 instrument. These two 
extreme positions do not do justice to the DoPs as the instrument is founded on equitable 
                                                          
301 Supra Whittington note 262, pp. 596, 600; Supra MIT Report note 10. 
302 Supra Franck note 28, p. 56. 
303 ‘Al-Sisi criticised for waiving Egypt's right over Nile water’ Middle Eastern Monitor (23 March 
2015) https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/17657. 
304 Negash, M., Hassan, S., Muchie, M., & Girma, A., ‘Perspectives on the Declaration of 
Principles regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’ The Thinker Vol. 65 pp. 56-61 (2015) 
66 
 
utilisation and participation, guaranteeing the two countries water use rights ‘consistent 
with international law.’305 This is not to denounce reasoned criticisms of the Declaration. 
Negash et al, for instance, argue that Article ii of the Declaration ‘can be interpreted to 
exclude… the use of the waters for fishing, recreation, education and small scale industrial 
and irrigation projects around the dam’ and thus are ‘devoid of shared benefits and 
responsibilities.’306 It is doubtful that the DoPs was meant to ban non-harmful use of dam 
water such as fisheries, tourism and planting trees in the dam area some of which are 
clearly envisaged since the project’s inception.307 However, the DoPs rightly, but 
controversially, gave an apparent guarantee to Egypt and Sudan that the (key) purpose of 
the dam is not for irrigation uses. The DoPs could, however, be said to be unfair for 
Ethiopia as the full costs of the project are to be met from state and citizens’ coffers,308 
while the benefits will be shared with others. Egypt has managed to block all avenues of 
external funds for the GERD,309 despite some early reports suggesting that it offered to 
help financially.310  Egypt’s policy on external finances for upstream projects does not 
appear to have been discontinued post-DoPs. In this context one may question whether the 
deal made to export electricity to Egypt as a matter of priority is a fair deal for Ethiopia, 
although this will depend on the price to be fixed. As the filling, operation and flow of the 
dam might be heavily or lightly regulated in the interest of Egypt and Sudan, some level of 
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cost sharing would be imperative as part of the fair deal system. With respect to the Owen 
Falls dam of Uganda, Egypt was subjected to a 4.5 million Egyptian pounds expenditure to 
cover the costs of the dam in return inter alia for direct control of the flow of the dam.311  
Dam Filling and Operation 
 
To introduce a fair deal relating to the filling and operation of GERD requires an 
agreement on relevant principles and specific rules and guidelines. Article V of the DoPs, 
titled, ‘Principle to cooperate on the First Filling and Operation of the Dam’, should be the 
basis to consider what a fair filling and operation should look like.  
Dam operation 
 
Paragraph ‘b’ of Article V stipulates that the three countries ‘agree on guidelines and rules 
for the annual operation of GERD, which the owner of the dam may adjust from time to 
time.’ Under paragraph ‘c’ of the same principle it is further provided that: ‘to sustain 
cooperation and coordination on the annual operation of GERD with downstream 
reservoirs, the three countries, through the line ministries responsible for water, shall set 
up an appropriate coordination mechanism among them.’ In addition to the agreement on 
setting up suitable institutional mechanisms, this expressly recognises (a) the need for 
coordination between the operation of the GERD and downstream dams, and (b) the 
interests of both upstream and downstream parties, with the owner exercising some 
discretion to make adjustments on agreed operation plans. The studies to be conducted 
based upon the recommendations of the IPoE will, and should, feed into rules and 
modalities of dam operation and coordination to be agreed upon by the three countries.  
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Making this arrangement in line with the spirit of distributive justice would not be an easy 
matter. Egypt312 and Sudan might claim that the operation of the dam with respect to water 
flow regulation must not affect their current or historic use as set out in colonial-era Nile 
treaties, although this conflicts with the underlying principles adopted in the DoPs of 2015. 
In contrast, Ethiopia will most likely rely on its customary international law entitlement to 
equitable use as also accepted by the three parties. The 2014 MIT Report on the very same 
question stresses that operations of the GERD and downstream reservoirs ought to be 
coordinated ‘to ensure that economic and financial benefits are realized, and that the 
waters are equitably shared among all users.’313 
However, Ethiopia has to operate and use the dam in compliance with the duty to prevent 
significant harm on Sudan and Egypt. Customary international law, the DoPs and Ethiopia 
itself recognise this obligation. The MIT report further recommends that ‘to achieve 
Ethiopia’s “no harm” goal, it is important that the GERD, AHD, and Sudan’s reservoirs be 
operated in coordination by Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.’314 Ethiopia reiterated time and 
again that neither does it have the intention to harm Egypt and Sudan nor the studies it has 
conducted indicate such impacts. Given that GERD’s purpose and suitability is for 
hydropower generation and once the reservoir is filled with water, ‘Ethiopia will want to 
maintain large releases of water through the turbines in order to maximize its hydropower 
revenues.’315 Apart from safety and similar issues, as considered earlier, therefore, the 
potential of significant harm from GERD as a result of reduced water flow is remote in 
normal (excluding drought-like) dam operation conditions. The MIT report supports this 
assertion that ‘most of the time there will be relatively little conflict between Ethiopia’s 
desire to maximize the value of the GERD’s hydropower production and the water 
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requirements of downstream users.’316 For this reason, the question of harm arising from 
dam operation and water flow regulation, as an aspect of distributive justice, appears to be 
academic.  
 
Dam filling 
 
In contrast, GERD’s reservoir filling poses immediate and practical hopes and concerns to 
the dam owner and the two downstream countries respectively. The MIT report 
meticulously summaries this tension as follows: 
Both Sudan and Egypt should be especially interested in GERD releases during filling 
and periods of drought, because at these times the interests of the downstream riparians 
differ from those of Ethiopia. Egypt and Sudan need releases from the GERD to meet 
minimum water requirements, but Ethiopia may prefer to increase the quantity of water 
stored in the GERD reservoir.317 
Questions of dam filling and coordination of different reservoirs during filling are largely 
technical matters. The legal basis that inform a fair filling legal and policy option for the 
GERD are of interest here. Article V of the DoPs provides that: 
The Three Countries, in the spirit of cooperation, will utilize the final outcomes of the 
joint studies, to be conducted as per the recommendations of the IPoE Report and agreed 
upon by the TNC, to …agree on guidelines and rules on the first filling of GERD which 
shall cover all different scenarios, in parallel with the construction of GERD.318 
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Until now no agreement has been reached on dam filling guidelines and rules for the 
GERD by the three countries.319 However, the MIT 2014 Report and subsequently 
published scholarship have dealt with some general and detailed filling scenarios and 
options for the GERD. The MIT Report, recognising Ethiopia’s natural desire and 
incentive to fill out the dam quickly and downstream impacts of such speedy filling, 
recommended an agreement on dam filling to be flexible and adaptable 
to the actual sequence of Nile flows that occurs while the GERD reservoir is filling. It 
must be able to meet the agreed objectives given the many possible conditions of the 
Eastern Nile water resource each year: AHD reservoir storage level, the GERD storage 
level and Blue Nile flow. For example, if during filling of the GERD reservoir the AHD 
is full, Egypt could draw down the AHD reservoir to meet its water requirements as Blue 
Nile flow is stored in the GERD reservoir, effectively shifting storage upstream and 
reducing evaporation losses from the AHD reservoir … However, if the AHD reservoir 
storage is low, then less Blue Nile flow could be stored in the GERD reservoir and 
agreed downstream releases could be made for Egypt and Sudan…. Any filling 
agreement must have provision for meeting the minimum water requirement for Egypt 
and Sudan.320 
In contrast, Zhang, Erkyihun and Block321 proposes a fixed annual or monthly release of 
water combined with a pre-defined number of years for filling. Unlike the MIT report, this 
approach provides with specific scenarios and options for GERD filling. Without trying to 
predict the effects of climate change on the streamflow of the Blue Nile, Zhang et al 
looked at three fixed filling scenarios and options, 4, 6 and 8 and 10+ years of filling the 
dam. The 4 and 10+ years filling options are seen as two extreme options that might be 
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favoured by Ethiopia and downstream countries respectively. The 4-year filling option, as 
the shorter period of filling, would be beneficial to Ethiopia to yield its huge investment 
and support its economy. This option will also be beneficial to downstream and other 
neighbouring countries to getting a relatively cheaper electricity from Ethiopia as soon as 
possible. Sudan’s hydropower322 and potentially agriculture, will also benefit from 
GERD’s full-scale flow. This option was used when filling the Aswan High Dam in Egypt 
without causing a major crisis on Egyptian agriculture, hydropower and other economic 
activities there.323  However, the GERD is built on the Blue Nile which makes around 60% 
of Nile waters, Egyptian agriculture, fisheries and hydropower might (or might note) 
sustain significant harm, even if temporarily, if Ethiopia fills the GERD in four or less 
years’ period.324  For this reason, this option may not provide a fair result and is less likely 
to attract consensus from the three countries.  
The 10+ years’ option is equivalent to a filling of 10% monthly streamflow325 of the Blue 
Nile. This filling option will certainly benefit Egypt and perhaps Sudan as the GERD 
filling won’t be felt much downstream. In turn, Ethiopia will not get its investment returns 
including satisfying its acute electricity demands, leave alone to sale to neighbouring 
countries. This option is not thus only detrimental to Ethiopia but also to the region as it 
defeats the regional integration aims and objectives of the GERD as adopted in the DoPs. 
This option also fundamentally defeats the essence of distributive justice as it effectively 
blocks the enjoyment of legal rights by Ethiopia and its people.  
It was proposed that the 6 and 8-year filling options, with emphasis on the 6 years’ period, 
which is roughly translated to mean an average 25% monthly streamflow of the Blue Nile 
                                                          
322 Supra Wheeler et al note 295, p. 630. 
323 It is quite obvious that Egypt could not possibly fill the huge Aswan High Dam reservoir while 
negatively affecting its irrigated agriculture.  
324 Zhang et al note 20, p. 608. 
325 Ibid. 
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can serve as a compromised solution.326 This will enable GERD to generate electricity in 
full capacity to Ethiopia in the medium term, a better flow and flood control to Sudan and 
a potentially cheaper electricity and a better water flow to Egypt, without causing a 
significant interruption to the supply needs of downstream communities.  
Agreeing on pre-defined number of years for filling may not be the sole option available 
on the table, or it may be better implemented in conjunction with other approaches. For 
example, Wheeler et al’s327 GERD filling scenarios and options avoid pre-defined years-
based strategy for filling; aiming at eliminating ‘all risks of the HAD reaching the 
minimum power elevation’, which is necessary for both hydropower-generation from the 
HAD and satisfying all other downstream demands, they proposed 35 BCM or more water 
release per-annum from GERD during the filling period. Such a ‘middle ground’, they 
argue, will bring ‘increased benefits (for Ethiopia and the region) and reduced downstream 
risks (for Egypt and Sudan).’328 This appears to contradict the ‘minimum requirement’ 
threshold proposed by the MIT report. In addition to the fixed options, however, Wheeler 
et al advocates for agreeing on a ‘safeguard policy’ to release more water when unplanned 
shortages or drought occur downstream in addition to the 35 BCM annual release. 329  
Given that the total GERD’s reservoir capacity is 74 BCM, and if the 35 BCM annual 
release is agreed, GERD would less likely be in full capacity as conceded by the same 
scholars.330 While finding a middle ground to addressing the concerns of downstream 
Egypt and Sudan is essential, and Ethiopia should aim to do what it takes to minimise any 
harm on Egypt and Sudan during GERD filling, this ought to be re-balanced by the 
legitimate interests of Ethiopia including its huge unilateral investment and the temporary 
                                                          
326 Ibid, pp.600—601. 
327 Supra Wheeler et al note 295, pp. 611-634. 
328 Ibid, pp.630-631. Clarification added. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid. 
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nature of dam filling. What this means is that it may not necessarily be fair to claim a 
nearly status quo position on water flow during dam filling.  
The legal basis for filling, similar to that of dam operation, must be the ones adopted in the 
DoPs and also available in customary international law—equitable use, no significant 
harm, cooperation and the likes, and absolutely not existing water quota-based on colonial-
era treaties. Be that as it may, in addition to, at least, making sure that minimum water 
supply to Egypt and Sudan is maintained during GERD filling, vital human needs (such as 
water supply for drinking and sanitation and arguably for subsistence farming)331 must not 
be affected at anytime during dam filling. Affecting such vital needs through human 
conduct would not server distributive justice to Sudan and Egypt and their communities. 
This approach should also be adhered to even after the end of dam filling.    
In brief, the issue of dam filling and dam operation are crucial to understanding the 
distributive justice results of the GERD. Both areas require an informed decision making 
and (flexible) agreement. While scholars and consultancy firms may provide some options 
and scenarios, a fair deal can only be obtained through good faith negotiations. As there is 
no rigid qualitative or empirical formula that can be used to implement accurate fairness 
for the three countries some compromises must be made to balance the costs and benefits 
of the filling and operation of the GERD. Such compromises shall take into account 
situations of drought, water availability in Sudanese and Egyptian reservoirs and wetter 
and drier seasons so as to prevent significant harm downstream. This ought to be done on a 
firm belief, as required by the DoPs, that filling, operation and utilisation of GERD in a 
coordinated fashion would bring a fair result to the three countries, their communities, the 
                                                          
331 Supra UNWCC note 65, Art 10 which is about the: 
Relationship between different kinds of uses (states that)  
1.In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an international watercourse 
enjoys inherent priority over other uses. 
2.In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it shall be resolved with 
reference to articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given to the requirements of vital human 
needs. (Italics and ‘states that’ added). 
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region and the natural environment.332 Apparently, this is not going to be an easy task to 
accomplish.  
 
Hopes and Challenges of Ensuring Distributive Justice 
 
The tripartite recognition of the core principles of customary watercourses law, supported 
by further details of operation and management of the dam must be commended as a step 
in the right direction. Yet translating the detailed factors for equitable use and preventing 
significant harm into something concrete would still be a delicate matter be it in relation to 
dam filling, dam operation or in general terms. Two examples are offered to illustrate this 
challenge generally. The first is how to assess the water needs of downstream Egypt (and 
Sudan) and upstream Ethiopia. With respect to the water needs of both sides, following the 
signing of the DoPs, President Al-Sisi told the Ethiopian Parliament in March 2015 that: 
I invite you today to jointly lay the foundations of a better future for our children and 
grandchildren, a future where all the classrooms in Ethiopia are lit and all the children of 
Egypt can drink from the River Nile as their fathers and grandfathers did.333 
This is consistent with previous policy of Egypt which sees the Nile as a matter of life and 
death for Egypt, while a question of development or energy provision for Ethiopia.334 The 
Nile is undoubtedly vital for the livelihood and the existence of millions of Egyptians, 
although it is well documented that Egypt also has renewable and non-renewable 
                                                          
332 This approach is adopted for example in the Southern African Development Communities 
(SADAC) region see Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses (2000), Art 2 (c ) 
http://www.sadc.int/files/3413/6698/6218/Revised_Protocol_on_Shared_Watercourses_-_2000_-
_English.pdf.  
333 ‘Egypt stresses Nile water rights in Ethiopia dam project’ Daily Mail (25 March 2015) 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3011635/Egypt-stresses-Nile-water-rights-Ethiopia-
dam-project.html. 
334 Supra Egypt’s Perspective note 5. 
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groundwater (aquifer) resources which can supplement current Nile water uses by the 
Country.335  
The president’s characterisation of the water needs of both countries, if only applicable to 
the GERD seems reasonable. However, that does not seem to be the case if the statement is 
read in conjunction with Egyptian Constitution and policy. If such determination of the 
water needs of the parties concerned is correct, either in its limited or broader senses, it 
would be in the interest of distributive justice to give priority to Egypt (and Sudan) over 
Ethiopia and the rest of upstream countries’ water needs. Any use of Nile waters contrary 
to ‘vital human needs’ of downstream populations would contravene the distributive 
justice component of fairness.336 The GERD National Panel of Expert, however, asserts 
that 
 …of all African Countries, surely of all Nile Basin countries, it is only Egypt that has 
over 98% of its population with access to potable water, while an Ethiopian girl of 
sixteen has to go on average 6 kilometres each day back and forth to fetch a gallon of 
water from a river or a dug hole….’337 
 Worthy of mention is the fact that fetching water is only possible in Ethiopia if it is 
available on the ground, which entirely relies on adequate rainfall.  
The second example concerns the challenge of applying socio-economic needs as a factor 
for determining equitable water use of Egypt and Ethiopia. In articulating why Ethiopia 
‘won’ the diplomatic and legal battle regarding the GERD, Salman argues that:   
                                                          
335 Abdel-Shafy, H. I., & Aly, R. O., ‘Water Issue in Egypt: Resources, Pollution and Protection 
Endeavours’ Central European Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine Vol. 8(1) 
pp. 3-21 (2002) http://www.omfi.hu/cejoem/Volume8/Vol8No1/CE02_1-01.html, pp. 3-21; 
Eckstein, G. G. E., Hydrologic Reality: International Water Law and Transboundary Ground-
Water Resources, paper and lecture for the conference on ‘Water: Dispute Prevention and 
Development’ (American University Centre for the Global South, Washington, D.C., 12-13 
October 1998). 
336 Supra UNWCC note 65, Art. 10. 
337 ‘A Proxy Campaign against Ethiopia? A Response by GERD National Panel of Experts 
(NPoE)’ Ethiopian International Professional Support for Abay/Nile (EIPSA) Vol. 1(3) pp. 1-9 
(2014) http://www.eipsa1.com/cms/articles/GERDFINALNPOERebuttalIRN.pdf, p.5. 
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Ethiopia has relied in its strategy on the fairness of its cause as it is the source of 86% of 
the Nile water while it uses only 1% of that Nile water. Yet it continued undergoing 
successive famines, especially those of 1983-85 which claimed about a million lives, in 
addition to the crushing poverty the Ethiopian people are suffering from.338 
As we write and debate the fairness of the GERD, Ethiopia is trying to heal its wounds 
from the severe drought which affected millions of its citizens.339 This is likely to reoccur, 
unless the country’s total dependency on rainfall for agriculture ceases to exist.  
Undeniably, Egypt is richer than Ethiopia in food security, drinking water availability and 
economic development terms. Recent data shows that Egypt’s per Capita income is 
$3,950.7 while Ethiopia’s $567.8.340 Extreme poverty in upstream countries including 
Ethiopia is ubiquitous; lack of class-room and home light in most parts of rural Ethiopia is 
just one aspect of the problem. Millions of Ethiopians need food, basic closing, shelter and 
health services, despite the economic progress made in recent years. What this means is 
that Ethiopia’s need to use the Blue Nile (or other tributaries) is neither a question of 
luxury nor limited to generating electricity.  
Yet such apparent inequality between Egypt and Ethiopia may be accepted or 
accommodated for the reason that distributive justice ‘recognises’ or appreciates disparity 
in countries’ wealth and development as an inevitable fact.341 International (watercourses) 
law firmly favours ‘the achievement of more rational and equitable international economic 
relations.’342 It is doubtful that the DoPs impliedly endorses inequality as a factor for 
                                                          
338 Salman, S., ‘How and Why has the Ethiopian Strategy on the Renaissance Dam Succeeded?’ 
Sudan Vision, (25 May 2015), http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=248051. 
339Myrie, C., ‘El Nino threatens 'millions in east and southern Africa’ BBC News (10 November 
2015) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34779447. 
340 GDP per capita (2010-2014 Data), World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD . 
341 (supra sec [features and challenges of fairness].  
342 Supra Charter of Economic Rights note 56, preamble, para. [a]. This resolution asserts, under 
Article 2(1), on the one hand, that ‘Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent 
sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and 
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sharing Nile resources. Whatever the position of the law may be on inequality, the 
principle of fairness requires working towards narrowing gaps in wealth.343  
Surely, the post-1990 undertakings are basically different from the old Nile treaties in that 
they aimed at addressing the fairness dilemma; given the uncertainties surrounding them, 
however, it may be question whether they are part of the dilemma at issue. As the next 
final part of the monograph demonstrate, however, they can lead to a way out from the 
fairness dilemma in the sharing of water resources in the Nile basin. 
 
Concluding Remarks: Lessons to be Learnt?  
After a careful analysis of the salient features of justice, equity and fairness, the 
monograph enlightens that the latter provides a solid legal basis to the sharing of 
transboundary resources. More specifically, the UNWCC and basin-specific (existing or 
emerging) regimes such as the CFA, represent a system of fair deal of sharing 
transboundary water resources. Such a system contests the (unjustified) rejection of 
distributive justice and its narrow construction in the equity discourse. As the eastern Nile 
basin countries are not parties to the UNWCC and the CFA (excepting Ethiopia), Frank’s 
theory of fairness has been tested with particular reference to the fairness of the GERD 
from colonial-era Nile treaties, post-1990 commitments and customary international law 
perspectives. The following five concluding remarks are drawn from the in-depth analysis 
made of the various instruments and applicable customary rules with the aims of 
addressing the questions asked at the outset.  
Firstly, despite the use of Nile colonial-era treaties to challenge the procedural and 
substantive fairness of the GERD, they are not compatible with the dictates of fairness. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
economic activities.’ Under Article 3, on the other hand, it states that: ‘In the exploitation of 
natural resources shared by two or more countries, each State must co-operate on the basis of a 
system of information and prior consultations in order to achieve optimum use of such resources 
without causing damage to the legitimate interest of others.’ 
343 Supra Franck note 28. 
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The real question or dilemma is thus whether they still exist or are laid to rest with the 
adoption of the DoPs. One observation may be that they are still alive and violated by the 
GERD project.344 The opposite and perhaps stronger observation is that, as they are totally 
rejected by most Nile co-riparians, as both procedurally and substantively flawed 
instruments, they cannot provide a fair system for sharing Nile resources. Worthy of note 
is that they are not suitable for compromises and negotiations. It follows from this that the 
fairness of the GERD345 cannot be questioned on the basis of these treaties. In fact, the real 
question is now whether the signing of the DoPs and the endorsement of the GERD by all 
Nile riparians, notably by Sudan and Egypt, have closed the existence of colonial-era Nile 
treaties for good. This conclusion includes the 1959 Nile Treaty which is at odds with the 
DoPs, the 1993 instrument, newly emerging Nile basin initiatives and conventional and 
customary international watercourses law. The lesson that should be learnt here is that 
unfair laws and practices cannot be considered as valid merely on technical (or procedural) 
grounds in modern international law, as the next key remarks further illustrate.    
Secondly, is the question of whether the 1993 and 2015 commitments, in contrast to the 
old Nile treaties, support or challenge the fairness of building, filling, operating and 
sharing the costs and benefits of the GERD. The first aims to promote joint studies for 
utilising Nile waters, without providing specific and complete procedural and substantive 
rules, which makes it either less attractive to assess the fairness of GERD or a commitment 
entirely disregarded by both parties as a result of the dominant practice of unilateralism 
rather than genuine cooperation in the (eastern) Nile basin. Thus, it became, although not 
at the level of the old treaties, part of the fairness dilemma, rather than resolving it. 
However, the 2015 instrument (DoPs), either as a legally binding commitment or 
                                                          
344 ‘Cairo University’s Report on Ethiopia's Great Renaissance Dam’, Group of Nile Basin (GNB) 
at Cairo University to Support Egypt (2013), Egyptian Chronicles, 
 http://web.mit.edu/12.000/www/m2017/pdfs/ethiopia/cairo.pdf. 
345 Supra MIT Report note 10, p. 11. 
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declaratory of conventional and customary rules, has changed the rules of the game in the 
use of Nile waters for the better. The impacts of this development to the fairness question 
is twofold. Firstly, unlike colonial-era treaties, and to some extent, the 1993 engagement, 
the DoPs has secured the full participation of the three main Nile riparians; this endeavour 
was assisted by an IPoE and by international firms in the quest of the parties to find a win-
win, proportionate and fair deal on the basis of modern principles of international 
watercourses law. Furthermore, the mechanisms introduced to implement the Declaration 
ranging from establishing joint national technical committees to that of heads of 
State/Government along the specific commitments to exchange information are significant 
achievements of cooperation. Clearly, these fulfil the dictates of procedural fairness as all 
the parties supported by international actors are participating in an equal footing. 
Secondly, the substance of the declaration, comprising the principles of equitable use, no 
significant harm, sustainable use, protecting the environment, dam safety and clean energy 
sharing reflect the hopes and fears of all the parties, and signify a system of distributive 
justice. For these reasons the DoPs, as an initial but a significant step in the right direction, 
meets the test of ‘perceived fairness,’346 in effect, makes the GERD as a classic example of 
fairness in action and the DoPs as the best, if not absolute, tool adopted to unlock the 
fairness dilemma in the (eastern) Nile basin.  
Thirdly, this unprecedented development has, however, encountered multifaceted 
challenges which range from a lack of shared understanding on relevant factors for 
equitable use, notably water and socio-economic needs of the parties involved, contested 
claims over the effects and benefits to that of resistance to change from both ends 
(excluding Sudan). Particularly, dam filling, dam operation and associated studies are 
leading to major differences. It is worthy of emphasis here that maximising the benefits of 
                                                          
346 Supra Franck note 28, p. 13. 
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the GERD while preventing and reducing potential consequences, as key components of 
the GERD’s fairness, can only be achieved if the parties keep the momentum of 
cooperation and promote reasonable benefit sharing347 which should underpin existing 
projects of cooperation such as the NBI. This provides both the opportunities and 
challenges to get rid of the dilemma over extreme claims and counter-claims for good. 
This requires clearing the current tense political fog which appears to be covering the eyes 
and minds of both sides from keeping the momentum of good faith negotiations and 
cooperation. 
Fourthly, the two instruments signed in the last two to three decades represent the 
aspirations of the parties to cooperate at a basin-level. In particular, the DoPs’ ambition to 
promote ‘transboundary cooperation and regional integration’348 along its endorsement of 
all principles of the CFA 2010 is a positive step towards regional cooperation. Yet, there 
has been no signal sent yet to spread this fair system to basin-level collaboration.349 
Tanzania’s immediate ratification of the CFA after the GERD’s declaration is signed ought 
to be noted to which other Basin countries may follow suit. This raises the question, if 
Egypt and Sudan signed the DoPs, why not the CFA 2010?  
One theory may be that they do not want to put legal constraints on their current use of 
Nile waters, assuming that the DoPs is not a hard law. The other more persuasive theory is 
that what has already been agreed with respect to the GERD represents contemporary legal 
principles and practices that are beneficial to all Nile co-riparians for securing their water 
share, and for being notified and consulted on future planned measures which will end 
existing unilateral practices and contentious projects. Such a basin level approach would 
also give a fairer result on the river and the environment with good returns to all. This is 
                                                          
347 Sadoff, C. W., & Grey, D., ‘Beyond the River: The Benefits of Cooperation on International 
Rivers’ Water Policy Vol. 4 pp. 389-403 (2002). 
348 Supra DoPs note 12, Art. II. 
349 Supra Kimenyi & Mbaku note 121. 
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not withstanding the need for a global cooperation and the likelihood that (some) Nile 
basin states may (or may not) seriously consider acceding to the UNWCC sooner or later. 
The message here is, therefore, while the bottom-up approach to fostering fairness is 
necessary such endeavours need to be reinforced by global, regional or basin-wide legal 
framework for a greater cooperation, coordination and sustainable use of resources.  
Finally, this monograph has demonstrated that without looking into the way in which laws 
come into being and the nature of their specific content on a case-by-case basis, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to judge them as just or unjust under contemporary 
international law. For example, Article 3 (1) of the UNWCC appears to respect the 
integrity and validity of existing treaties among states when becoming parties to the 
Convention, although paragraph 2 of the same article offers the option for harmonisation. 
What if an existing agreement of two or more states is at odds with the fundamentals of the 
Convention itself and general international law? Would they be able to join? Some wish to 
interpret this350 as an absolute safeguard clause to prior or later water agreements, unless 
concerned parties wilfully opt for harmonising them with the terms and spirit of the 
UNWCC. The International Law Commission (ILC) rightly clarified the question, within 
the spirit of paragraph 4 of the same article, however, that:  
 if a watercourse agreement is concerned with only part of the watercourse or only a 
particular project, programme or use relating thereto, it must be subject to the proviso 
that the use, by one or more other watercourse States not parties to the agreement, of the 
waters of the watercourse is not, to a significant extent, adversely affected by the 
agreement. Otherwise, a few States of a multi-State international watercourse could 
appropriate a disproportionate amount of its benefits for themselves or unduly prejudice 
the use of its waters by watercourse States not parties to the agreement in question. Such 
                                                          
350 See e.g. supra Aal note 156, pp28-29. 
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results would run counter to fundamental principles which will be shown to govern the 
non-navigational uses of international watercourses, such as the right of all watercourse 
States to use an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner and the 
obligation not to use a watercourse in such a way as to injure other watercourse States.351 
This has a wider connotation in international law. If a treaty or custom is failing to meet 
the test of fairness in both its aspects, taking into account, historical, societal and legal 
developments in a given field, it has to be disbanded or revised.  
As fairness can be relative, it is imperative to distinguish between making laws fairer and 
better in general terms from dealing with existing laws that defeat inter alia equality, 
sovereignty and equity which form among the key constituents of fairness. This may be 
criticised as a source of uncertainty in international law by those who overly rely on 
formalism and treaty (un)making and retaining techniques.  
However, those who see international law as a dynamic subject will argue that a formal 
process may not necessarily be procedurally fair; and even if it is so, the content of which 
may or may not be fair. If law is not flexible to adapt to changes and to correct historic or 
existing unfairness in their all forms, it will cause more havoc than stability in the 
international community in general and in affected regions in particular. This key lesson 
from the developments in the Nile is something international law cannot afford to ignore 
as doing so may further destabilise the system and erode confidence of community of 
states and their populations on the system, as justly envisaged and theorised by the great 
public international law scholar, Thomas Franck.352 
 
 
                                                          
351 ILC Draft articles on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses and 
commentaries thereto, 1994. 
 http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/8_3_1994.pdf.  
352 Supra Franck note 28, p. 7. 
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